University of Michigan Law School

University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository
Book Chapters

Faculty Scholarship

2012

Transfer Pricing Disputes in the United States
Reuven S. Avi-Yonah

University of Michigan Law School, aviyonah@umich.edu

Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/book_chapters/49

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/book_chapters
Part of the Business Organizations Law Commons, Taxation-Federal Commons, and the TaxationTransnational Commons

Publication Information & Recommended Citation
Avi-Yonah, Reuven S. "Transfer Pricing Disputes in the United States." In Resolving Transfer Pricing
Disputes: A Global Analysis, edited by E. Baistrocchi and I. Roxan. New York: Cambridge Univ. Press,
2012.

This Book Chapter is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at University of Michigan
Law School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Book Chapters by an authorized
administrator of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
mlaw.repository@umich.edu.

3

Transfer pricing disputes in the United States
REUVEN S. AVI-YONAH

3.1

Introduction

In 1988, the US Treasury Department published a study of inter-company
pricing (the 'White Paper') that included the following endorsement of
the so-called arm's length standard (ALS) for examining the reasonableness
of transactions between related parties for tax purposes:
The arm's length standard is embodied in all U.S. tax treaties; it is in each
major model treaty, including the U.S. Model Convention; it is incorporated into most tax treaties to which the United States is not a party; it has
been explicitly adopted by international organizations that have
addressed themselves to transfer pricing issues; and virtually every major
industrial nation takes the arm's length standard as its frame of reference
in transfer pricing cases. The United States should continue to adhere to
the arm's length standard. 1

What is the ALS, and why did the Treasury seek to defend it in these
terms? The problem for which the ALS attempts to provide the solution
may be illustrated by a simple example. Suppose that a product (e.g.,
computers) is manufactured by a corporation in country A, and then
sold to a wholly-owned subsidiary of the manufacturer in country B,
which proceeds to resell it to unrelated customers. In this common
situation, the taxable profit of the subsidiary is determined by three
factors: (i) the price at which it resells the computers to the unrelated
customers, (ii) its expenses other than cost of goods sold, and (iii) the
price which it pays its parent corporation for the computers. The first
two of these factors are governed by market forces outside the control of
the parent or the subsidiary. However, because the parent controls the
1

I.R.S. Notice 88-123, 1988-2 C.B. 458, 475 ('White Paper') (footnotes omitted). For
examples of more recent statements along the same lines, see J. Iekel, 'Samuels Defends
Revenue Estimating, Arm's Length Standard', 65 Tax Notes 1587 (16 December 1994);
J, Turro, 'Treasury Continues to Champion Worldwide Arm's Length Standard' 66 Tax
Notes 316 (16 January 1995).
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subsidiary, the third factor (the price for which the manufacturer sells
the computers to the reseller, or the 'transfer price') is wholly within the
control of the related parties. Accordingly, the potential for abuse arises
because the related parties will seek to increase after-tax profits by
manipulating the transfer price. If the effective tax rate in the manufacturer's country is higher, the price will be set as low as possible so as to
channel all taxable profit to the reseller. Conversely, if the effective tax
rate in the reseller's jurisdiction is higher, the transfer price will be as
high as possible, so as to eliminate any taxable profit of the reseller and
concentrate the entire profit in the hands of the manufacturer. But for
tax considerations, the affiliated parties do not care what the transfer
price is, since it merely reallocates profits within the affiliated group.
Given these facts, it is understandable that transfer pricing manipulation is one of the most common techniques of tax avoidance. This is
especially true in the international sphere, as there are great differences
in effective tax rates among jurisdictions. Indeed, some economists have
argued that the ability to manipulate transfer prices is a major reason for
the existence of multinational enterprises (MNEs), which are groups of
affiliated corporations operating in more than one country. 2 It is estimated that trading among such affiliates encompasses about one-third
of world manufacturing trade, 3 and that percentage is constantly
increasing. The transfer pricing problem is, therefore, one of the major
international tax policy challenges for the coming century.
The ALS, as traditionally conceived, responds to the transfer pricing
problem by seeking to determine whether transactions between related
taxpayers reflect their 'true' tax liability by comparing them to similar
transactions between unrelated taxpayers dealing at arm's length. This
was the definition of the ALS that was understood when the White Paper
was published in 1988. 4 However, as is reflected in the defensive tone of
the Treasury's pronouncements, the White Paper was written at a time
when this traditional conception of the ALS was coming under increasing criticism and suggestions for its replacement were rampant. In
particular, the legislative history of the Tax Reform Act of 1986 indicates

2

3

4

R. Gordon and J, Maclde-Mason, Why is there Corporate Taxation in a Small Open
Economy? The Rule of Transfer Pricing and Income Shifting, National Bureau of Economic
Research Working Paper No. 4690 (1994).
U.S. General Accounting Office, International Taxation: Problems Persist in Determining
Tax Effects of Intercompany Prices (1992), pp. 62-3.
White Paper, note l above, pp. 459-61.
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that Congress had mandated that the Treasury Department re-evaluate
the continued viability of the ALS. 5 The White Paper was issued in
response to this mandate. However, despite the Treasury's findings, the
process begun by the Congressional mandate eventually resulted in the
abandonment of the ALS, as it was understood in 1988. Its replacement,
in the United States and elsewhere, was a broader and more flexible
method of determining the allocation of taxable profits between related
entities. Although this broader method may also be characterised as
'arm's length', it is a different type of arm's length standard than the
one defended by the White Paper. Indeed, the White Paper itself played a
major part in the demise of the traditional ALS.
This chapter explores the process by which the traditional ALS became
the dominant method for determining transfer prices for tax purposes,
the reasons for its eventual downfall, and methods that can be used in its
place. First, a few definitional points are in order. The traditional ALS
refers primarily to a process by which the transfer price between affiliated
taxpayers is determined by using comparables - either of the same
product sold by one of the affiliated parties to an unrelated party, or the
same product bought by an affiliated party from an unrelated party, or of
the same product sold between two parties unrelated to the affiliated
parties and to each other. This method of comparison is usually called
the 'comparable uncontrolled price', or CUP method. 6 In addition, the
traditional ALS also encompasses two methods that likewise rely on
comparables, but do not require a transaction in the same product. Under
the 'cost plus' method, the transfer price is determined by comparing the
manufacturer to a similar entity (under a more relaxed standard of
comparability than under the CUP method), which is dealing with unrelated parties, and allocating to the manufacturer the costs borne by the
unrelated comparable, plus the unrelated party's profit margin. 7 The
'resale price' method is identical to the cost plus method except that it
applies to the reseller rather than the manufacturer. 8
The ALS, as traditionally conceived, is frequently contrasted with
'unitary', 'global' or 'formulary apportionment' methods, such as those
used by some states. Here the entire profit of an affiliated group is
allocated among its constituent entities by means of a formula (e.g., based
5
6

7

8

H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 99-841, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. II-638 (1986).
See, e.g., Treas. Reg. s. 1.482-2(e)(2); Treas. Reg. s. 1.482-3(b).
See, e.g., Treas. Reg. s. 1.482-2(e)( 4); Treas. Reg. s. 1.482-3(d).
See, e.g., Treas. Reg. s. 1.482-2(e)(3); Treas. Reg. s. 1.482-3(c).
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on each entity's assets, payroll and sales). 9 The major difference between
the ALS and the formulary method is that the ALS starts by treating each
entity in an affiliated group as a separate taxpayer, hypothetically dealing
with each other entity in the group at arm's length. Conversely, the
formulary approach starts with the entire affiliated group as one unitary
enterprise.
This chapter proposes that despite the common practice of contrasting the ALS and the formulary methods of dealing with the transfer
pricing problem, they are actually not dichotomous. Instead, they form
the two extreme ends of a continuum. 10 The cost plus and resale price
methods, which are included in the traditional ALS, already represent
one step away from pure separate treatment of each entity in the group.
This is because they involve taking the group's profits as a whole,
subtracting the profit margin allocable to the manufacturer or the
reseller on the basis of the comparables, and then allocating the residual
profit to the other party.
Next on the continuum comes the 'comparable profit method'
(CPM), which is a major innovation of the recent regulations under
9

10

For examples of recent contributions to the debate about the ALS and formulary
methods, see B. F. Miller, 'None are So Blind as Those Who Will Not See' 66 Tax Notes
1023 (13 February 1995); J. Turro, 'The Battle over Arm's Length and Formulary
Apportionment' 65 Tax Notes 1595 (26 December 1994); W. I. Wilkins and K. W.
Gideon, 'Memorandum to Worldwide Formulary Apportionment' 65 Tax Notes 1259
(5 December 1994); J. R. Hellerstein, 'Federal Income Taxation of Multinationals:
Replacement of Separate Accounting with Formulary Apportionment' 60 Tax Notes
1131 (23 August 1993); L. M. Kauder, 'The Unspecific Federal Tax Policy of Arm's
Length: A Comment on the Continuing Vitality of Formulary Apportionment at the
Federal Level' 60 Tax Notes 1147 (23 August 1993); E. J. Coffill and P. Wilson, Jr, 'Federal
Formulary Apportionment as an Alternative to Arm's Length Pricing: From the Frying
Pan to the Fire?' 59 Tax Notes 1103 (24 May 1993); B. F. Miller, 'A Reply to "From the
Frying Pan to the Fire'" 61 Tax Notes 241 (11 October 1993); R. Avi-Yonah, 'Slicing
the Shadow: A Proposal for Updating U.S. International Taxation' 58 Tax Notes 1511
(15 March 1993); and L. M. Kauder, 'Intercompany Pricing and Section 482: A Proposal
to Shift from Uncontrolled Comparables to Formulary Apportionment Now' 58 Tax
Notes 485 (25 January 1993). For a recent proposal to implement formulary methods in
the context of NAFTA, see P. R. McDaniel, 'Formulary Taxation in the North American
Free Trade Zone: A Policy Perspective' (1993-4) 49 Tax L Rev. 691.
This idea is stated briefly in B. J. Arnold and T. E. McDonnell, 'Report on the Invitational
Conference on Transfer Pricing: The Allocation of Income and Expenses Among Countries' (1993) 61 Tax Notes 177, 1381, but is not fully developed there or elsewhere. See
Amicus Brief of Council of State Governments, Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax
Board, 114 S.Ct. 2268 (No. 92-1384) (1994) (a brief by the present writer, outlining this
idea in the context of a recent case over the constitutionality of state formulary
methods).
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section 482 of the Internal Revenue Code ('the Code'), under which the
profit of either the manufacturer or the reseller is set by comparing it to
the average profit earned by a very broad group of corporations operating in the same or a similar industry. 11 The standard of comparison in
this case is very relaxed, and one may indeed regard the CPM as a type of
formula designed to ensure that the profits of the related party do not
fall outside a reasonable range of profit margins earned by other corporations which are not truly comparable with the related party. 12 As will be
shown below, the CPM falls outside the traditional or narrow definition
of the ALS, but it still uses some form of comparables.
Even further along on the continuum of possible methods of determining transfer prices is the 'profit split' method. This method was first
introduced in the 1988 White Paper. 13 Here, the allocation of profits is
determined in two steps. First, the functions performed by each of the
related parties are analysed and a market rate of return is allocated to
each function on the basis of comparables. 14 Then, the residual profit is
split between the related parties on the basis of a formula, without using
comparables. 15 The profit split method is very close to the pure formulary apportionment end of the transfer pricing continuum, because it
starts with the enterprise as a whole and allocates the profits in a
formulary fashion. The only differences are that some of the profits are
allocated on the basis of comparables, and that the formula used to split
the rest is more flexible than the traditional assets, payroll and salesbased formula used by the states.
Consequently, the words 'arm's length' can be used in two ways to
refer to two different possible ranges of solutions to the transfer pricing
problem. Under the traditional or narrow definition, 'arm's length' refers
to methods of determining transfer prices by using comparables, and
encompasses only the CUP, cost plus and resale price methods. 16 On the
other hand, 'arm's length' can also be used to refer to any method of
determining transfer prices that reaches results (i.e., a profit allocation)
that are the same as those that would have been reached between
unrelated parties. In this latter, broader sense, 'arm's length' can be used
11

13

14
16

12
Treas. Reg. s. 1.482-5.
Treas. Reg. s. 1.482-S(c).
White Paper, note 1 above, p. 490. The profit split method has since been adopted as part
of the current Treasury Regulations. See Treas. Reg. s. 1.482-6.
15
Treas. Reg. s. 1.482-6(b).
Treas. Reg. s. 1.482-6(c).
'Arm's length' does not refer to CPM, because the standard of comparability for CPM is
so loose that it is doubtful whether it can truly be regarded as relying on comparables,
and it has therefore been excluded from the traditional definition of the ALS.
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to refer to the entire transfer pricing continuum, because even pure
formulary apportionment may result in the same profit allocation as
that which unrelated parties would have reached.
The next four parts of this chapter analyse the origins, rise, decline
and fall of the traditional or narrow ALS, as applied to international
transactions between related parties under section 482 of the Code and
its predecessors. 17 The analysis will show that despite the Treasury's
affirmation of the traditional ALS in its 1988 White Paper, 18 this narrow
conception of the standard was already obsolete by 1988 in the large
majority of cases, insofar as the United States' approach to international
taxation was concerned. Subsequent developments, especially the 19921995 proposed, temporary and final regulations under section 482 of the
Code, merely strengthened the nails in its coffin. The last sections of the
chapter will focus on post-1995 litigation and then on the following
questions: (1) Why has the traditional ALS proven so inadequate? (2)
What methods are now used to supplement it? and (3) What additional
improvements can be made in resolving the transfer pricing problem?
3.2

Origins (1917-1928)

Transfer pncmg manipulation is one of the simplest ways to avoid
taxation. It is, thus, not surprising that the predecessors of section 482
of the Code, legislation designed to combat such manipulation, date back
almost as far as the modern income tax itself. They originated in regulation 41, chapters 77 and 78, of the War Revenue Act of 1917, which
gave the Commissioner authority to require related corporations to file
consolidated returns 'whenever necessary to more equitably determine
the invested capital or taxable income'. 19 The earliest direct predecessor
of section 482 of the Code dates to 1921, when the Commissioner
17

18
19

The literature on s. 482 is immense. Some major contributions include J. P. Fuller,
'Section 482 Revisited' (1976) 31 Tax L Rev. 475; James P. Fuller, 'Section 482: Revisited
Again' (1990) 45 Tax L Rev. 421; Richard 0. Loengard, The Section 482 Pot Boils On:
Comments on Recent Developments' (1991) 469 Tax Forum; Dale W. Wickham, 'The
New U.S. Transfer Pricing Tax Penalty: A Solution, or a Symptom of the Cause, of the
International Transfer Pricing Puzzle?' (1991) 18 Int'l Tax] l. The best historical survey
of the ALS up to 1986 is contained in Stanley I. Langbein, 'The Unitary Method and the
Myth of Arm's Length' 30 Tax Notes 625 (17 February 1986) (focusing on the development of the ALS in the international context).
See note 1 above and accompanying texts.
T.D. 2694, 20 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 294, 321 (1918). See also War Revenue Act of 1917,
Ch. 63, 40 Stat. 300 (1917).
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was authorised to consolidate the accounts of affiliated corporations 'for
the purpose of making an accurate distribution or apportionment of
gains, profits, income, deductions, or capital between or among such
related trades or business'. 20 This legislation was enacted, in part, because
of the tax avoidance opportunities afforded by possessions corporations,
which were ineligible to file consolidated returns with their domestic
affiliates. 21 Thus, the problem of international tax avoidance through
related corporations was one of the original motives for the enactment of
the earliest predecessor of section 482 of the Code.22 In 1928, the
provision was removed from the consolidated return provisions (which
were eliminated).

3.2.1

Section 45: allocation of income and deductions

In any case of two or more trades or businesses (whether or not incorporated, whether or not organised in the United States, and whether or
not affiliated) owned or controlled directly or indirectly by the same
interests, the Commissioner is authorised to distribute, apportion or
allocate gross income or deductions between or among such trades or
businesses, if he determines that such distribution, apportionment or
allocation is necessary in order to prevent evasion of taxes or clearly to
reflect the income of any of such trades or businesses. 23
This language is almost identical to section 482 of the Code as it read
prior to the Tax Reform Act of 1986. 24 The legislative history of section
45 of the Code, in its entirety, is as follows.
Section 45 is based upon section 240(f) of the 1926 Act, broadened
considerably in order to afford adequate protection to the government
20

21

22

23
24

Revenue Act of 1921, Ch. 136, s. 240(d), 42 Stat. 260 (1921) (re-enacted in Revenue Act
of 1924, Ch. 234, s. 240(d), 43 Stat. 288 (1924), and Revenue Act of 1926, Ch. 27, s. 240
(f), 44 Stat. 46 (1926)). Unlike the current IRC s. 482, these earlier provisions allowed
taxpayers to request that the Commissioner permit consolidation.
'Subsidiary corporations, particularly foreign subsidiaries, are sometimes employed to
"milk" the parent corporation, or otherwise improperly manipulate the financial
accounts of the parent company.' H.R. Rep. No. 350, 67th Cong., 1st Sess. 14 (1921);
see also S. Rep. No. 275, 67th Cong., 1st Sess. 20 (1921).
For surveys of the history of IRC s. 482, see White Paper, note 1 above, ch. 2; Eli Lilly &
Co. v. Commissioner, 84 T.C. 996, 1114-15 (1985).
Revenue Act of 1928, Ch. 852, s. 45, 45 Stat. 806 (1928).
Among the few changes, 'Organizations' was added to 'trades or businesses', 'credits or
allowances' were added to 'gross income or deductions', and 'the Secretary or his delegate
may' was substituted for 'the Commissioner is authorized to'. See IRC s. 482.
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made necessary by the elimination of the consolidated return provisions
of the 1926 Act. The section of the new bill provides that the Commissioner may, in the case of two or more trades or businesses owned or
controlled by the same interests, apportion, allocate or distribute the
income or deductions between or among them, as may be necessary in
order to prevent evasion (by the shifting of profits, the making of
fictitious sales and other methods frequently adopted for the purpose
of 'milking'), and in order clearly to reflect their true tax liability. 25
Senator Gifford stated on the floor that 'what worries us is that any
two of these corporations can get together and take advantage of questionable sales to each other to get deductions'. 26 Senator Green replied
that 'Section 45 permits the bureau to allocate the income where it
belongs. It ... does not permit these corporations to place the expenses
. wh ere th ey want to put th em.' 27
JUSt
Congress' focus in enacting the predecessor of section 482 of the Code
was, thus, to prevent tax evasion and to clearly reflect 'true' tax liability.
However, there was no discussion of what the standard of 'true' liability
was. In 1935, the Service issued regulations under section 45 of the Code,
which stated that the following standards would govern its application.

3.2.2

Scope and purpose

The purpose of section 45 is to place a controlled taxpayer on a tax parity
with an uncontrolled taxpayer, by determining, according to the standard of an uncontrolled taxpayer, the true net income from the property
and business of a controlled taxpayer. The interests controlling a group
of controlled taxpayers are assumed to have complete power to cause
each controlled taxpayer so to conduct its affairs that its transactions and
accounting records truly reflect the net income from the property and
business of each of the controlled taxpayers. If, however, this has not
been done, and the taxable net incomes are thereby understated, the
statute contemplates that the Commissioner shall intervene, and, by
making such distributions, apportionments or allocations as he may
deem necessary of gross income or deductions, or of any item or element
25

26

27

H.R. Rep. No.2, 70th Cong., 1st Sess. 16-17 (1927); see also S. Rep. No. 960, 70th Cong.,
1st Sess. 24 (1928).
69 Cong. Rec. 605, cited in J. Seidman, Legislative History of Federal Income Tax Laws
1938-1861 (1938), p. 522.

Ibid.
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affecting net income, between or among the controlled taxpayers constituting the group, shall determine the true net income of each controlled
taxpayer. The standard to be applied in every case is that of an uncontrolled taxpayer dealing at arm's length with another uncontrolled
taxpayer. 28
Thus, the ALS, under US tax law, was born. This section of the
regulations, in very similar language, remained in effect under section
482 of the Code until the recently-issued modifications. 29
However, the regulations were not modified to explain what methods
should be used to arrive at an arm's length price until 1968. Previously,
this task was left to the courts.

3.3

Rise ( 1928-1972)

The early cases applying section 45 of the Code did not mention the
ALS. Instead, they focused on the statutory terms 'evasion of taxes' and
'clear reflection of income'. 30 It was not until the 1935 regulations were
issued, that the arm's length nature of the transaction between related
parties came into focus. 31 However, for a long period thereafter, the
courts applied a wide variety of standards to determine what constituted
a transaction that clearly reflected the taxpayer's income. 32
Seminole Flavor Co. v. Commissione? 3 is a good example of these early
cases. The issue was whether transactions between a corporation and a
partnership organised to market the corporation's products should
be adjusted to shift income from the partnership to the corporation. 34
28

29

30

31

32

33

Art. 45-1 (c) of Reg. 86 (1935) (Revenue Act of 1934). The entire regulation is quoted in
Essex Broadcasters, Inc. v. Commissioner, 2 T.C. 523, 528 (1943).
Treas. Reg. s. 1.482-1(b)(l) redesignated as Treas. Reg. s. 1.482-1A(b)(l); cf.
Temp. Treas. Reg. s. 1.482-1T(a)(1) and (b) (1993); Treas. Reg. s. 1.482-1(b)(l). See
generally discussion in section 3.5 below. The ALS was adopted under the influence of
concurrent developments in international taxation and the initial evolution of model
standards. See S. I. Langbein, 'The Unitary Method and the Myth of Arm's Length'
(1986) 30 Tax Notes 625, 628-34.
See, e.g., Asiatic Petroleum Co. v. Commissioner, 31 B.T.A. 1152, 1159 (1935) (stating that
a sale was not 'arm's length' but not focusing on this issue); aff'd 79 F.2d 234 (1935).
See, e.g., G. U.R. Co. v. Commissioner, 41 B.T.A. 223 (1940) (sale of stock at seven times its
market value not arm's length); aff'd 117 F.2d 187 (1940).
See, e.g., National Securities Corp. v. Commissioner, 137 F.2d 600 (3rd Cir. 1943); cert.
denied 320 U.S. 794 (1943). This leading case for the application of section 45 to tax-free
transfers to corporations surveys the history of s. 45 but does not mention the ALS.
34
4 T.C. 1215 (1945).
Ibid. 1229.

NORTH AMERICA AND EUROPE

The Tax Court, in holding for the taxpayer, stated that the arm's length
nature of the transaction should be determined by whether it was 'fair
and reasonable', and that the question of whether unrelated parties
would have entered into the same agreement was irrelevant. 35 It then
went on to hold that:
The commission fixed does not appear to be out of line with petitioner's
own experience [i.e., its expenses for marketing prior to forming the
partnership]. On this basis the transaction would seem to be fair and
entitled to classification as an arm's length transaction. Whether any such
business agreement would have been entered into by petitioner with total
strangers is wholly problematical. 36

Other cases from the same period show similar tendencies to apply a
variety of standards and to ignore the question of whether comparables
exist. The standards employed included whether the transaction was
'fair' on the basis of the functions performed by the parties; 37 whether
the related party paid 'full fair value'; 38 and whether the prices paid
would have been considered 'fair and reasonable' in the trade. 39
On the other hand, in Hall v. Commissioner, 40 a somewhat later Tax
Court case, a comparable was used to establish the arm's length price.
Hall involved sales to a Venezuelan marketing affiliate at cost plus 10 per
cent (a price which amounted to a discount of over 90 per cent from the
regular list price) when unrelated distributors of the same product
received a discount of only 20 per cent. 41 The Tax Court held that gross
income had been arbitrarily shifted to the Venezuelan corporation, and
that the Commissioner's allocation 'reflected Hall's income as if he had
been dealing with unrelated parties. That, of course, was the purpose of
the statute.' 42
The early cases, thus, appear inconsistent in their application of arm's
length. The question of whether the ALS should always be applied was
35
36

Ibid. 1232.
Ibid. 1233; see also Palm Beach Aero Corp. v. Commissioner, 17 T.C. 1169, 1176 (1952)
('fair consideration which reflects arm's length dealing').

37

Grenada Industries, Inc. v. Commissioner, 17 T.C. 231,260 (1951), aff'd 202 F.2d 873 (5th

38

Friedlander Corp. v. Commissioner, 25 T.C. 70, 77 (1955); Motors Securities Co., Inc. v.
Commissioner, 11 T.C.M. 1074, 1082 (1952).
Polak's Frutal Works, Inc. v. Commissioner, 21 T.C. 953, 976 (1954).
41
32 T.C. 390 (1959), aff'd 294 F.2d 82 (5th Cir. 1961).
Ibid. 410.
Ibid. (citing Asiatic Petroleum Co. v. Commissioner, 31 B.T.A. 1152 (1935), which did not,

Cir. 1953); aff'd 346 U.S 819 (1953).

39
40

42

however, involve a direct application of the ALS).
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finally raised in Frank v. International Canadian Corporation, 43 decided
in 1962, which was twenty-seven years after the initial promulgation of
the standard in regulations. 44 The case involved transfer prices for sales
of chemicals by a US parent to a Western hemisphere trade corporation
(WHTC). The parties stipulated that the sales reflected a 'reasonable
price and profit' between the two corporations, and the District Court
found that the Commissioner had thereby stipulated himself out of
court on the section 45 issue. 45 The Commissioner appealed, arguing
that the District Court used the 'reasonable return' standard instead of
the proper arm's length standard. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit affirmed in the following terms:
We do not agree with the Commissioner's contention that 'arm's length
bargaining' is the sole criterion for applying the statutory language of
section 45 in determining what the 'true net income' is of each 'controlled
taxpayer'. Many decisions have been reached under section 45 without
reference to the phrase 'arm's length bargaining' and without reference to
Treasury Department Regulations and Rulings which state that the talismanic combination of words - 'arm's length' - is the 'standard to be
applied in every case'. For example, it was not any less proper for the
District Court to use here the 'reasonable return' standard than it was for
other courts to use 'full fair value', 'fair price, including a reasonable
profit', 'method which seems not unreasonable', 'fair consideration which
reflects arm's length dealing', 'fair and reasonable', 'fair and reasonable' or
'fair and fairly arrived at', or 'judged as to fairness', all used in interpreting
section 45. 46

Thus, the Ninth Circuit essentially invalidated the regulations, and
held that it was not necessary to establish what unrelated taxpayers
would have done in order to clearly reflect the 'true' income and correct
tax liability of related parties. 47
One can only speculate as to what would have happened had the
courts been left free to develop their own definition of 'fair' or

43
45

46

47

44
308 F.2d 520 (9th Cir. 1962).
See note 28 above and accompanying texts.
Frank, note 43 above, 308 F.2d at 528.
Ibid. 528-9 (citations omitted) (citing Friedlander Corp. v. Commissioner, 25 T.C. 70, 77
(1955); Grenada Industries, Inc. v. Commissioner, 17 T.C. 231, 260 (1951); Motors
Securities Co., Inc. v. Commissioner, 11 T.C.M. 1074, 1082 (1952); Palm Beach Aero Corp.
v. Commissioner, 17 T.C. 1169, 1176 (1952); Polak's Frutal Works, Inc. v. Commissioner, 21
T.C. 953, 975-6 (1954); and Seminole Flavor Co. v. Commissioner, 4 T.C. 1215, 1232
(1945).
Cf. Treas. Reg. 86, s. 45-1(b) (1935).
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'reasonable' without having to adhere to the ALS. 48 During the same
era as the Frank decision, major developments were taking place in
Washington that would ultimately lead to the establishment of standards
under section 482 of the Code (as section 45 of the Code had now been
renumbered). The early 1960s were marked by a rise in concern on the
part of the Treasury that domestic corporations were achieving deferral
through transfer pricing practices with tax haven affiliates, and that
foreign corporations were avoiding taxes altogether by artificially
lowering the profits of their US affiliates. The Treasury contended that
section 482 of the Code was not effectively protecting the US tax
jurisdiction. 49
Congress responded with legislation intended to stop these perceived
abuses. Section 6 ofH.R. 10650, as introduced by the House Committee
on Ways and Means, provided for a new Code section, section 482(b). 50
Under the House proposal, in section 482 cases involving international
transfers of tangibles, unless the taxpayer could demonstrate an arm's
length price (defined, in accordance with the traditional view, as a price
based on a matching or comparable adjustable transaction), or unless
the taxpayer and the IRS could agree on a different method, the transfer

48

49

50

See, e.g., Nestle Company, Inc. v. Commissioner, 22 T.C.M. 46, 62 (1963), decided just
after Frank and before Oil Base, Inc. v. Commissioner, 23 T.C.M. 1838 (1964), discussed at
note 56 below, in which the Tax Court analysed the royalty rate for a valuable intangible
(for which no comparables could in any case be found) in an eminently sensible way
under a 'reasonableness' standard, including a renegotiation of the rate to reflect
profitability, without having to resort to an 'arm's length' analysis. See also Ballentine
Motor Co., Inc. v. Commissioner, 39 T.C. 348, 357 (1962), aff'd 321 F.2d 796 (4th Cir.
1963) ('taxpayers owned or controlled by the same interests may enter into transactions
inter se and if fair, or resulting from arm's length bargaining, such transactions will be
undisturbed'). This decision was also rendered shortly after Frank.
Hearings on the President's 1961 Tax Recommendations Before the Committee on Ways
and Means, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., vol. 4 at 3549 (1961) (statement of Commissioner
Caplin); see Langbein, 'The Unitary Method and the Myth of Arm's Length', note 17
above, 643-4. These concerns are remarkably similar to those voiced currently. See, e.g.,
R. L. Kaplan, 'Treasury Blasted over Alleged Transfer Pricing Shenanigans', 55 Tax Notes
150 (13 April 1992); R. L. Kaplan, 'International Tax Enforcement and the Special
Challenge of Transfer Pricing' (1990) U Ill. L Rev. 299.
H.R. 10650, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. s. 6 (1962). Important among the other provisions that
were introduced to curb transfer pricing abuses was subpart F, adopted in 1962. IRC s.
952-64. This provision defines the income of controlled foreign corporations that is not
eligible for tax deferral and for which dividends to the US parent must be imputed. For a
brief overview of the relationship between IRC s. 482 and subpart F, see Kaplan,
'International Tax Enforcement' note 49 above, 307-11.
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price would be determined under a formula based on assets, compensation
and expenses related to the transferred tangible property. 5 1
The House Report explained the intent of section 6 of the bill as
follows:
Present law in section 482 authorizes the Secretary of the Treasury to
allocate income between related organizations where he determines this
allocation is necessary 'in order to prevent evasion of taxes or clearly to
reflect the income of any such organizations'. This provision appears to
give the Secretary the necessary authority to allocate income between a
domestic parent and its foreign subsidiary. However, in practice the
difficulties in determining a fair price under the provision severely limit
the usefulness of this power especially where there are thousands of
different transactions engaged in between a domestic company and its
foreign subsidiary.
Because of the difficulty in using the present section 482, your committee has added a subsection to this provision authorizing the Secretary
of the Treasury or his delegate to allocate income in the case of sales or
purchases between a U.S. corporation and its controlled foreign subsidiary on the basis of the proportion of the assets, compensation of the
officers and employees, and advertising, selling and promotion expenses
attributable to the United States and attributable to the foreign country
or countries involved. This will enable the Secretary to make an allocation
of the taxable income of the group involved (to the extent it is attributable to the sales in question) whereas in the past under the existing
section 482 he has attempted only to determine the fair market sales
price of the goods in question and build up from this to the taxable
income - a process much more difficult and requiring more detailed
computations than the allocation rule permitted by this bill.
The bill provides, however, that the allocation referred to will not be
used where a fair market price for the product can be determined. It also
provides that other factors besides those named can be taken into
account. In addition, it provides that entirely different allocation rules
may be used where this can be worked out to mutual agreement of the
Treasury Department and the taxpayer. 52

Predictably, the taxpayer community responded by lobbying Congress
to remove section 6 from H.R. 10650, claiming that the regulatory
authority under section 482 of the Code was sufficient to curb abuses. 53
Their efforts were rewarded in the Senate version of the bill, which
51
52
53

H.R. 10650, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. s. 6 (1962).
H.R. Rep. No. 1447, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 28 (1962).
See, e.g., Hearings on H.R. 10650 before the Senate Committee on Finance, 87th Cong.,
2d Sess. 560-1, 725-6 (1962) ('Hearings') (statements by W. Slowinski and R. Landolt).
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omitted the section. In conference, the House receded. The Conference
Report states the reasons as follows:
The conferees on the part of both the House and the Senate believe that
the objectives of section 6 of the bill as passed by the House can be
accomplished by amendment of the regulations under present section
482. Section 482 already contains broad authority to the Secretary of the
Treasury or his delegate to allocate income and deductions. It is believed
that the Treasury should explore the possibility of developing and
promulgating regulations under this authority which would provide
additional guidelines and formulas for the allocation of income and
54
deductions in cases involving foreign income.

The Treasury took three years to respond to this invitation. 55 In the
meantime, however, significant new developments were taking place in
the courts. Oil Base, Inc. v. Commissione.,.S 6 represented a classic case of
the application of the ALS to sales commissions paid by a US corporation to its Venezuelan marketing affiliate. These commissions were
about twice the amount that the same corporation had paid its previous
unaffiliated distributor of the same product in Venezuela, and were twice
the amount it was currently paying to distributors in other countries.
The taxpayer, however, argued that the Frank standard should be applied
instead of arm's length, and that since it still retained higher profits from
export sales to Venezuela even after the double commission than from
domestic sales, the commissions were 'reasonable' under Frank. The Tax
Court, in a memorandum decision, disagreed. It held that:
It is unnecessary for us to decide whether the sole standard in cases under
section 482 is one of an amount which would be arrived at in arm's length
transactions between unrelated parties. The commissioner has been given
much latitude in his use of section 482 when necessary to prevent the
evasion of Federal income tax by shifting of profits between taxpayers
subject to common control. The burden is on petitioner to show error in
respondent's allocation. There is no evidence to show that the percentage
return retained by petitioner on domestic sales would represent a
54

55

56

H.R. Rep. No. 2508, 87th Cong, 2d Sess. 18-19, reprinted in 1962 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3732,
3739.
Regulations, which did not accept the invitation to use a formula approach, were
proposed in 1965, Prop. Treas. Reg. ss. l.482-1(d) and 2, 30 Fed. Reg. 4256 (31 March
1965) (these regulations did not include any provisions on sales of tangibles), withdrawn
and reproposed in 1966, Prop. Treas. Reg. ss. l.482-1(d) and 2, 31 Fed. Reg. 10394 (31
March 1966), and issued in final form in 1968, Treas. Reg. s. 1.482. See discussion at note
71 below.
Oil Base, Inc. v. Commissioner, 23 T.C.M. 1838 (1964).
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reasonable return on export sales. There is likewise no evidence to show
that the amount of commissions and discounts paid to Oil Base, Venezuela, represented a reasonable amount, a fair amount, or an amount
which would meet any of the other criteria referred to by the Court in
Frank. Certainly the fact that these commissions are almost double those
paid by petitioner to unrelated persons in arm's length transactions is
evidence that they were not fair and reasonable. 5 7

Presumably, the taxpayer in Oil Base was encouraged to litigate,
despite the egregious facts, because appeal lay to the Ninth Circuit.
On appeal, the taxpayer, citing Frank, repeated the argument that the
Commissioner erred in applying a standard of arm's length bargaining
that was not in the statute. The Court of Appeals, however, held that
the application of arm's length was appropriate:
We cannot agree. Where, as here, the extent of the income in question is
largely determined by the terms of business transactions entered into
between two controlled corporations it is not unreasonable to construe
'true' taxable income as that which would have resulted if the transactions
had taken place upon such terms as would have applied had the dealings
been at arm's length between unrelated parties.
Frank v. International Canadian Corporation [308 F.2d. 520 (9th Cir.
1962)], did not hold that the arm's length standard established by regulation was improper. It held that it was not 'the sole criterion' for
determining the true net income of each controlled taxpayer. However,
permissible departure from the regulation's arm's length standard was,
under the facts of that case, very narrowly limited and the holding has no
application to the facts before us.
We conclude that the arm's length bargaining standard was properly
applied pursuant to regulation. Hall v. Comm'r, 294 F.2d 82 (5th Cir.
1961). 58

In a footnote, the Ninth Circuit specified that Frank only applied
in cases where (a) there was no evidence of an arm's length price, and
(b) because of the 'complexity of the circumstances ... it would have
been difficult for the court to hypothesize an arm's length transaction'. 59
It is difficult to reconcile this reading of Frank with the list of possible
standards given by the Frank panel four years earlier, which relegated the
ALS to a very minor role. In effect, the Ninth Circuit overruled Frank,
holding that the ALS must be applied not only when comparables exist,
57

58
59

Ibid. 1845-6 (citations omitted).
Oil Base, Inc. v. Commissioner, 362 F.2d 212, 214 (9th Cir. 1966) (footnote omitted).
Ibid. 214; see also note 5 above.
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but also when they do not exist, as the court can 'hypothesise' a
comparable. This abrupt reversal was very likely influenced by the
egregious facts of Oil Base and by the difficulties in applying a 'reasonableness' standard. It also seems likely that the Tax Court and the Ninth
Circuit were influenced by the perception of widespread abuse as a result
of the Washington hearings on the Revenue Act of 1962, and by the
endorsement of the Commissioner's powers in the legislative history of
that Act. 60
The Commissioner's victory in Oil Base was followed by a series of
cases which applied the ALS, although not always to the Commissioner's
satisfaction. In Johnson Bronze Co. v. Commissioner, 61 the taxpayer
formed an international marketing subsidiary in Panama for the majority of its foreign sales accounts. The Commissioner reallocated 100 per
cent of the subsidiary's income to the parent under section 482 of the
Code. The Tax Court held that the 100 per cent allocation was arbitrary
and unreasonable. 62 In determining the proper allocation, the court held
that 'the standard to be applied in every case is that of an uncontrolled
taxpayer .dealing at arm's length with another uncontrolled taxpayer'. 63
In a footnote, the court referred to Frank as requiring a choice between
the 'reasonable' and 'arm's length' standards, but stated that 'on this
subject we shall only say that, on the facts of this case, the only reasonable price charged by petitioner would be one which would have been
arrived at if the parties were at arm's length'. 64 The court then held that
the allocation should be based on the prices charged by unrelated parties
that bought the same products from the taxpayer for resale in foreign
markets. 65
Eli Lilly & Co. v. Commissioner, 66 the first of several section 482 cases
involving pharmaceutical manufacturers, involved transfer pricing
between Eli Lilly & Co. (Lilly) and its subsidiary which qualified as a
WHTC. The Commissioner based his reallocation on the profit earned
by Lilly on sales to domestic distributors, arbitrarily divided in half to
reflect volume discount. The Claims Court agreed, holding that Lilly's
contention that it should be allowed to benefit from the tax subsidy to

60

61
63
64
65

See Hearings, note 53 above, 3549; Langbein, 'The Unitary Method and The Myth of
Arm's Length', note 17 above, 643-4.
62
24 T.C.M. (CCH) 1542 (1965).
Ibid. 1556.
Ibid. (citing Treas. Reg. s. l.482-(b)(1)).
Ibid. 1556 and see note 3 above (1965) (Oil Base is not cited).
66
Ibid. 1557.
372 F.2d 990 (1967).
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WHTCs 'would require the court to ignore the provisions of Treas. Reg.
1.482-1 ', requiring the application of the ALS. This is because if the
subsidiary were unrelated it would not have been able to retain all the
profit on the sales. 67
Lilly then cited Frank, in arguing that its allocation was motivated by
business purposes and was 'fair' and 'reasonable', and thus that the ALS
should not control. The Court of Claims disagreed:
The Ninth Circuit has since indicated that only a very narrow departure
from the arm's length standard was allowed in the particular circumstances
of Frank [citing Oil Base]. Moreover, even accepting Eli Lilly's interpretation
that Frank establishes a criterion of a fair and reasonable price, such a price
can best be determined by hypothesizing to an arm's length transaction. The
thrust of section 482 is to put controlled taxpayers on a parity with uncontrolled taxpayers. Consequently, any measure such as 'fair and reasonable' or
'fair and fairly arrived at' must be defined within the framework of'reasonable' or 'fair' as among unrelated taxpayets. Simply because a price might be
considered 'reasonable' or 'fair' as a business incentive in transactions
among controlled corporations, does not mean that unrelated taxpayers
would so consider it. Thus, even if the arm's length standard is not the sole
criterion, it is certainly the most significant yardstick. 68

The problem, as the taxpayer pointed out, is that in the absence of any
comparables, it is unclear how the arm's length price should be
'hypothesised'. To this question, the Court of Claims gave no answer. It
rejected the comparables offered by Lilly (bulk sales to government
agencies) because the market was not comparable, yet accepted the
revenue agent's arbitrary decision to cut the profits of the Western
hemisphere trade affiliates by half because the results were 'reasonable'. 69
When examining the outcome, it is hard to see what relevance the ALS
had to the court's ultimate determination?0
In 1968, the regulations under section 482 ofthe Code were finalised,
and thereafter, they formed the starting point of the analysis in the
courts. 71 With few changes, these regulations applied to transfer pricing
until the temporary regulations became effective in April1993. 72 Despite

67

70

71

72

69
68
Ibid. 997.
Ibid. 1000.
Ibid. 997.
See also Young & Rubicam, Inc. v. United States, 410 F.2d 1233 (1969) (applying the ALS
to services on the basis of Eli Lilly and Oil Base, but doing so without comparables).
T.D. 6952, 1968-1 C.B. 218 (1968). See S. S. Surrey, 'Treasury's Need to Curb Tax
Avoidance in Foreign Business Through Use of 482' (1968) 28 ]. Taxation 75 (discussing
the policy behind these regulations).
See T.D. 8470, 1993-1 C.B. 90 (1993).
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the invitation in the legislative history of the 1962 Act, the Treasury
made no attempt to devise 'formulas' to apply section 482 of the Code. 73
Instead, for the first time, the regulations attempted to establish rules for
applying the ALS to specific types of transactions, but with different
degrees of specificity. 74 For services, the regulations merely recited the
ALS without any guidance as to its application in the absence of comparables.75 For intangibles, the regulations contemplated a failure to find
comparables. They list twelve factors to be taken into account, but
without establishing any priority or relative weight among them? 6
The greatest detail was given for transfers of tangible property. Treasury Regulation section 1.482-2(e) described the three methods that
should be used in determining an arm's length price: the comparable
uncontrolled price (CUP) method, the resale price method, and the
cost plus method, in that order of priority. 77 All three methods relied
on finding comparable transactions, either directly or by reference to
appropriate mark-ups. 78 In the absence of comparables, the regulations
stated that:
Where none of the three methods of pricing ... can reasonably be applied
under the facts and circumstances as they exist in a particular case, some
appropriate method of pricing other than those described in subdivision
(ii) of this subparagraph, or variations on such methods, can be used. 79

The courts were, therefore, left free to determine their own 'fourth
methods' in the absence of comparables.
These regulations effectively ensured that the courts would apply the
ALS. A 1970 case, Woodward Governor Co. v. Commissioner, 80 may have
represented the last challenge to the standard. The taxpayer organised
foreign subsidiaries to act as marketing agents for overseas sales of
73

74

75
77

79

80

This may have been the result of Assistant Secretary Surrey's adherence to the ALS. The
Treasury may also have felt that it lacked the authority to promulgate a formulary
system. See Langbein, 'The Unitary Method and the Myth of Arm's Length', note 17
above, 648.
On the 'radical' nature of the regulations and their departure from earlier models see
Langbein, ibid. 645-6. These regulations underlay the successful US attempt to establish
the ALS as the international 'norm', as reflected in the White Paper, note 1 above and
accompanying texts. See Langbein, ibid. 646-54.
76
Treas. Reg. s. 1.482-2(b)(3).
Treas. Reg. s. 1.482-2(d)(2).
78
Treas. Reg. s. 1.482(e)(l)(ii).
Treas. Reg. s. 1.482-2(e)(2)-(4).
Treas. Reg. s. 1.482-2(e)(1)(iii). This language did not appear in the 1966 version of the
regulations, which did not say what should be done in the absence of com parables. See
Prop. Treas. Reg. s. 1.482-2, 31 Fed. Reg. 10394 (1966).
55 T.C. 56 (1970).
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aircraft parts. The Commissioner applied the resale price method in
reallocating income to the taxpayer. The taxpayer argued that the regulations were invalid in their requirement that the ALS should govern all
cases. In the alternative, they argued that if the ALS should be applied,
the CUP method should be used on the basis of sales of the same parts to
General Electric. The Tax Court accepted the latter argument and therefore did not reach the former. 81
In the meantime, other courts were finding that the ALS must be
applied in section 482 cases. Baldwin-Lima-Hamilton Corp. v. United
Statel 2 involved transfer pricing between the taxpayer and its WHTC
subsidiary. The Commissioner reallocated all of the income of the
subsidiary to the taxpayer. The district court held that the reallocation
was arbitrary, and upheld the taxpayer's allocation based on pricing
studies using assumptions that were 'tipped in the taxpayer's favor', by
using inappropriate comparables. 83 The Court of Appeals reversed in
part, and remanded to the district court for partial reallocation on the
basis of the ALS, stating that the district court 'should reject those
aspects of the [taxpayer's] theories which do not meet the arm's length
standard'. 84
United States Gypsum Co. v. United States, 85 involved two section 482
issues: shipping fees paid by the taxpayer to its Panamanian subsidiary
and transfer pricing for goods sold by the taxpayer to its WHTC. The
district court held for the taxpayer on both issues. On the shipping issue,
it held that the amounts were 'reasonable and ... equal to an arm's
length charge' because they were 'within the range' of unrelated party
prices (based on comparables). 86 On the transfer pricing issue, the
district court held that even though the prices were arbitrarily set to
shift income to the WHTC, on the basis of cases like Frank and Polak's
Frutal which allowed similar mark-ups, the prices were 'not unreasonable' (which the district court considered to be automatically equivalent
to arm's length). 87
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the first
holding and reversed the second. 88 On the shipping issue, the Seventh
Circuit had considerable misgivings as to whether the alleged

81
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86
88

83
84
435 F.2d 182 (1970).
Ibid. 186-7.
Ibid.
304 F.Supp. 627 (N.D. Ill. 1969), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 452 F.2d 445 (7th Cir.
1971).
87
Ibid. 634.
Ibid. 644-5.
U.S. Gypsum Co. v. United States, 452 F.2d 445, 449 (7th Cir. 1971).

Ibid. 65-8.
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comparables were indeed comparable, and whether unrelated parties
would not have adjusted the terms of the contract once the profits that
the shipping subsidiary was making became clear, but affirmed under a
'clearly erroneous' standard. 89 On the transfer pricing issue, the Seventh
Circuit reversed, rejecting the district court's reliance on Frank and its
predecessors and its application of a 'reasonableness' standard:
We do not consider the cited cases helpful in deciding whether, as a
matter of fact, USG's prices to [the WHTC] were the same as would have
been reached in arm's length dealing. Insofar as these cases support a
proposition that there may be 'reasonable' prices, different from those
which would have been reached in arm's length dealing, which will result
in clearly reflecting the income of controlled taxpayers, we respectfully
decline to follow them. 90

Thus, the Seventh Circuit held, as argued by the Commissioner, that
applying the ALS was mandatory in all section 482 cases. 91 Two other
cases from approximately the same period illustrate the courts' determination to adhere to the ALS even when the Commissioner attempted
to apply a different standard. PPG Industries, Inc. v. Commissionern
involved the application of section 482 of the Code to a Swiss marketing
subsidiary of a US manufacturer of glass, paint and chemical products.
The Tax Court held for the taxpayer on the grounds that (a) the
Commissioner's original allocation, based on the Source Book of Statistics
of Income, was arbitrary and did not meet the ALS; 93 (b) most of the
taxpayer's sales were at arm's length prices based on comparables; 94 and
(c) the Commissioner's comparable for the remaining sales was inappropriate, and the taxpayer's allocation was 'fair' and 'reasonable' and
therefore met the arm's length standard. 95
Ross Glove Co. v. Commissioner 6 represents the application of section
482 of the Code to an inbound transaction, involving the sale of sheepskins to the taxpayer by a Bahamian corporation which also provided
sewing services. The Commissioner attempted to hold the taxpayer to its
representations to the Philippine authorities, regarding the mark-up on

89
93

95

96

90
91
92
Ibid. 448-9.
Ibid. 449.
Ibid.
55 T.C. 928 (1970).
94
Ibid. 993.
Ibid. 994-5.
Ibid. 997-8. The PPG Industries case is significant in two other respects: it represents an
early attempt by the Commissioner to deviate from the ALS and to use industry statistics
(prefiguring the current Treasury regulations), and it represents an early case of functional analysis and profit split by the court (prefiguring the White Paper).

60 T.C. 569 (1973 ).
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its costs for currency control purposes. The Tax Court rejected this
argument and held that 'there is nothing in section 482 or the regulations thereunder to indicate that the arm's length standard of section 482
is to be ignored simply because of representations made in foreign
countries'. 97 The court then determined the transfer price on the basis
of arbitrary adjustments to an approximate comparable. 98
Finally, perhaps the greatest triumph for the ALS came in Lufkin
Foundry and Machine Co. v. Commissioner. 99 The case involved transfer
pricing between the taxpayer and its WHTC. The taxpayer introduced
evidence regarding the reasonableness of its marketing arrangements,
and the Tax Court held for it on that basis. 100 The Commissioner
appealed, citing the need to meet the ALS and arguing that no evidence
regarding a taxpayer's internal operations could satisfy the standard on
its own. 101 The Fifth Circuit held for the Commissioner, stating that:
No amount of self-examination of the taxpayer's internal transactions
alone could make it possible to know what prices or terms unrelated
parties would have charged or demanded. We think it palpable that, if
the [arm's length] standard set by these unquestioned regulations is to be
met, evidence of transactions between uncontrolled corporations unrelated to Lufkin must be adduced in order to determine what charge would
have been negotiated for the performance of such marketing services. 102

The courts came a long way. A mere decade before Lufkin, the Frank
court had declared that, contrary to the regulations, the ALS was only
one of many possible criteria under section 482. 103 It then became the
sole criterion, set by 'unquestioned' regulations, and any attempt to
establish transfer prices without referring to comparables was invalid.
Little guidance, however, was given on what to do in the absence of
comparables; and in light of his failed attempts in PPG Industries and
Ross Gloves to use evidence that was not based on the ALS, the Commissioner may well have wondered whether his victory in Lufkin could turn
out to be a pyrrhic one.
97

98

100
103

Ibid. 599. Note that the ALS has by now, in the view of the Tax Court, been incorporated
into the statute. This is also evidenced by a series of related cases in which the
Commissioner attempted unsuccessfully to hold the taxpayer to customs valuations.
See, e.g., Brittingham v. Commissioner, 66 T.C. 373 (1976), aff'd 598 F.2d 1375 (5th Cir.
1979); Dallas Ceramic Co. v. United States, 74-2 USTC (CCH) 19830 (N.D. Tex. 1974),
rev'd 598 F.2d 1382 (5th Cir. 1979).
99
Ross Glove Co., note 96 above, 60 T.C. at 602.
468 F.2d 805 (5th Cir. 1972).
102
101
Ibid. 806-7.
Ibid.
Ibid. 808.
See note 46 above and accompanying texts.

NORTH AMERICA AND EUROPE

3.4

Decline (1972-1992)

The period between 1972 (when Lufkin was decided) and 1992 (when
the proposed section 482 regulations were issued) can be described as a
gradual realisation by all parties concerned, but especially Congress and
the IRS, that the ALS, firmly established by 1972 as the sole standard
under section 482, did not work in a large number of cases, and in other
cases its misguided application produced inappropriate results. The
result was a deliberate decision to retreat from the standard while still
paying lip service to it. This process, which began with the 1986 amendments to section 482, was exacerbated by the White Paper in 1988,
and culminated in the proposed section 482 regulations of 1992, the
temporary section 482 regulations of 1993, and the final section 482
regulations of 1994, which essentially eliminated the traditional ALS for
the great majority of section 482 cases.
The decline of arm's length can be illustrated by comparing major
international section 482 cases decided prior to 1973, with major cases
decided after 1973 and prior to 1993. Relative to the cases of the
pre-1973 era, comparables were infrequently found in the later cases. 104

104

If one takes only the cases surveyed in the White Paper, note 1 above, and the few major
cases decided between 1988 and 1992, one finds that up to 1973, the ALS based on
comparable transactions was employed in nine of fourteen cases (64%). From 1974
onward, comparables were found only in four of thirteen majors. 482 cases (31%). In
all of these four cases (Eli Lilly & Co. v. Commissioner, 856 F.2d 855 (7th Cir. 1988);
Paccar, Inc. v. Commissioner, 85 T.C. 754 (1985); U.S. Steel Corp. v. Commissioner, 617
F.2d. 942 (2d Cir. 1980); and Bausch & Lomb Inc. v. Commissioner, 933 F.2d 1084 (2d
Cir. 1991)) the Service argued that the comparable was inappropriate, and in U.S. Steel
and Bausch & Lomb, it attempted to reverse the result in the proposed and temporary
regulations. The White Paper cites the following cases decided prior to 1973: National
Securities Corp. v. Commissioner, 137 F.2d 600 (3rd Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 794
(1943); Hall v. Commissioner 294 F.2d 82 (5th Cir. 1961); Nestle Co., Inc. v. Commissioner, 22 T.C.M. 46 (1963); Oil Base, Inc., 362 F.2d 212 (9th Cir. 1966); Johnson Bronze
Co., 24 T.C.M. 1542 (1965); Eli Lilly & Co., 372 F.2d 990 (1967); Young & Rubicam, Inc.
v. United States, 410 F.2d 1223 (1969); U.S. Gypsum Co., 452 F.2d 445 (7th Cir. 1971);
Woodward Governor Co., 55 T.C. 56; Baldwin-Lima-Hamilton Corp., 435 F.2d 182
(1970); PPG Industries Inc., 55 T.C. 928 (1970); Lufkin Foundry and Machine Co., 468
F.2d 805 (5th Cir. 1972); Ross Glove Co., 60 T.C. 569 (1973); and R.T. French Co. v.
Commissioner, 60 T.C. 836 (1973). The White Paper cites the following cases decided
after 1974: Dallas Ceramic Co. v. United States, 598 F.2d 1382 (5th Cir. 1979); Cadillac
Textiles, Inc. v. Commissioner, 34 T.C.M. 295 (1975); Edwards v. Commissioner, 67 T.C.
224 (1976); E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. United States, 608 F.2d 445 (Ct. Cl. 1979);
U.S. Steel Corp. v. Commissioner, 617 F.2d 942 (2d Cir. 1980); Hospital Corp. of America
v. Commissioner, 81 T.C. 520 (1983); Eli Lilly & Co. v. Commissioner, 856 F.2d 855 (7th
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The causes for this decline in the application of arm's length are complex, and are discussed more fully in section 3.5. Part of the explanation,
of course, is that after the courts accepted the ALS, cases where comparables could easily be found were less likely to get litigated. But the fact
that litigation proliferated nonetheless suggests that in too many cases
the ALS was not workable. In order to understand why, it is necessary to
examine the major section 482 cases from the last two decades. 105
Consider first some major cases in which a comparable was found.
R. T. French Co. v. Commissioner, 106 decided in 1973, illustrates one type
of problem that the IRS encountered in applying arm's length. In French,
the taxpayer, a US subsidiary of a UK parent, negotiated a royalty rate
for the parent's valuable patented process for producing instant mashed
potatoes in 1946, for a twenty-one-year period. This was before the
profitability of the process was known and when there was an unrelated
49 per cent minority shareholder in the parent. In 1960, when the
minority shareholder had been bought out and the process had proved
extremely profitable, the licensing contract was amended, but the royalty
rate remained unchanged for the duration of the contract. 107

105

106

Cir. 1988); Ciba-Geigy Corp. v. Commissioner, 85 T.C. 172 (1985); Paccar, Inc. v.
Commissioner, 85 T.C. 754 (1985); G.D. Searle & Co. v. Commissioner, 88 T.C. 252
(1987). Major cases decided between 1988 and the issuance of the proposed regulations
in 1992 are Bausch & Lomb, Inc. v. Commissioner, 933 F.2d 1084 (1989); Sunstrand Corp.
v. Commissioner, 96 T.C. 226 (1991); Merck & Co. Inc. v. United States, 24 Cl.Ct 73, 91-2
USTC 150,456, at 89,736 (1991). Of these cases, comparables were used only in U.S.
Steel, Eli Lilly (for one year), Paccar and Bausch & Lomb.
The White Paper reports that in international examinations generally, 'fourth
methods' were used 36 per cent of the time, see White Paper, note 1 above, p. 502,
and that other estimates of this figure range from 14 per cent to 47 per cent. Ibid. 463.
However, the most telling number is that in an astounding 91 per cent of the cases
examined, the taxpayers did not use comparables in establishing transfer prices. Ibid.
502. See also US General Accounting Office, IRS Could Better Protect U.S. Tax Interests
in Determining the Income of Multinational Corporations (1981) pp. 29 (finding that of
403 cases studied, in dollar terms, the CUP method based on direct compar<).bles
accounted for only 3 per cent of the adjustments).
The following discussion is based on cases decided between 1973 and the issuance of the
proposed regulations in 1992. Since 1992, there have been several more s. 482 cases
based on the old regulations, and the results have been similar to those described in the
text. However, the IRS has been slightly more successful, as the litigating skills utilised in
s. 482 cases have improved. See, e.g., Perkin-Elmer Corp. v. Commissioner, 66 T.C.M.
(CCH) 634 (1993); Seagate Technology, Inc. v. Commissioner, 102 T.C. 149 (1994); and
National Semiconductor Corp. v. Commissioner, 67 T.C.M. (CCH) 2849 (1994).
107
60 T.C. 836 (1973).
Ibid. 838-9.
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The Service argued that unrelated parties would have amended the royalty
rate so that it would be commensurate with the income derived from the
patent, and that the low rates of the contract resulted in constructive
dividends to the UK parent, which should be subject to withholding. 108
The Tax Court disagreed. It held that the original1946 contract was negotiated at arm's length because of the 49 per cent minority shareholder in the
UK parent: 'The position of [the minority shareholder] in the scheme of
things in all likelihood assured the arm's length character of the transaction.'109 Thereafter, the fact that profitability changed 'in no way detracted
from the reasonableness of the agreement when it was made', and there was
no basis for a section 482 adjustment 'so long as the «arm's length" test is met.
There is no reason to believe that an unrelated party in [the parent's) position
would have permitted petitioner to avoid its contractual obligations.'no
French illustrates the fallacy of relying entirely on the arm's length nature of
the original contract, when the economic results are clearly disproportionate
to the parties' expectations when that contract was signed. The Service found
itself in the position of having to argue against the ALS it had espoused for so
long, citing as its primary authority a case (Nestle) that was decided in the
short interval between Frank and Oil Base, when the standard was not
established as the main criterion for section 482. Not surprisingly, the Tax
Court found this hard to accept after the Service had worked so hard to
establish arm's length as the standard in all section 482 cases.m It took
thirteen years and the 1986 Tax Reform Act to reverse the result of French.
U.S. Steel Corp. v. Commissioner 112 illustrates another type of problem
that is recurrent in applying arm's length: the difficulty of comparing intragroup with outside transactions, even when the same product or service is
involved. U.S. Steel owned a Liberian subsidiary, Navios, which it used to
ship steel from Venezuela to the United States. The prices charged by Navios
were set at a level that would make the steel price equal to the price of
domestic steel manufactured by U.S. Steel, and the same price was charged
by Navios for shipping for unrelated corporations, albeit at much lower
113
quantities. As a result Navios had high profits which were totally exempt
from tax. In Tax Court, the Service successfully upheld its reallocation of
US $52 million in profits to the taxpayer. 114
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Ibid. 836-7 (citing Nestle Co., Inc. v. Commissioner, 22 T.C.M. (CCH) 46 (1963)) (the
Service was in the unusual position of arguing that royalties to a foreign parent were too
low).
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The taxpayer appealed and the Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit reversed. The court held:
We are constrained to reverse because, in our view, the Commissioner has
failed to make the necessary showings that justify reallocation under the
broad language of section 482 . . . The Treasury Regulations provide a
guide for interpreting this section's broad delegation of power to the
Secretary, and they are binding on the Commissioner ... [citing the ALS]
This 'arm's length' standard ... is meant to be an objective standard that
does not depend on the absence or presence of any intent on the part of
the taxpayer to distort his income ... We think it is clear that if a taxpayer
can show that the price he paid or was charged for a service is 'the
amount which was charged or would have been charged for the same
or similar services in independent transactions with or between unrelated
parties' it has earned the right, under the Regulations, to be free from a
section 482 reallocation despite other evidence tending to show that its
activities have resulted in a shifting of tax liability among controlled
corporations. 115

The court thus concluded that the only issue was the comparability of
Navios' transactions with those of unrelated parties. It held that they
were comparable, despite the differences in volume and the assurance of
continued service as a result of the parties' relationship, and despite the
taxpayer's ability to manipulate the prices of the steel so as to leave a
larger profit to the tax exempt shipper. 116 The court stated that:
Attractive as this argument is in the abstract, it is a distortion of the kind
of inquiry the Regulations direct us to undertake. The Regulations make
it clear that if the taxpayer can show that the amount it paid was equal to
'the amount which was charged ... for the same or similar services in
independent transactions' he can defeat the Commissioner's effort to
invoke section 482 against him. 117

The court rejected the Commissioner's argument that transactions
with 'independent' parties are only relevant in a competitive market and
not where U.S. Steel had a de facto monopoly, holding that this would
impose an 'unfair' burden on the taxpayer. Finally, it addressed the Tax
Court's attempt to return to a reasonableness standard:
In at least one portion of Judge Quealy's opinion, however, it appears that
the reason he relied upon to hold Navios' charges too high is not at all a
matter involving the comparison of rates Steel paid to those paid by other
steel companies. He said that what the rates paid by Steel must be measured
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117
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against in order to see if a section 482 reallocation is justified is 'what might
be a reasonable charge for a continuing relationship involving the transportation of more than 10 million tons of iron ore per year'. If this is indeed the
inquiry, then the fact that other steel companies paid Navios the same rates
Steel did is irrelevant. We are constrained to reject this argument. Although
certain factors make the operations undertaken by Navios for Steel uniqueat one point, for example, Navios' ore carriers were the largest of their kind
in the world - the approach taken by the Tax Court would lead to a highly
undesirable uncertainty if accepted. In very few industries are transactions
truly comparable in the strict sense used by Judge Quealy. To say that
Pittsburgh Steel was buying a service from Navios with one set of expectations about duration and risk, and Steel another, may be to recognize
economic reality; but it is also to engraft a crippling degree of economic
sophistication onto a broadly drawn statute, which- if'comparable' is taken
to mean 'identical', as Judge Quealy would read it- would allow the taxpayer
no safe harbor from the Commissioner's virtually unrestricted discretion to
reallocate. 118

Given the history of the ALS, it is hard to see how the court could have
reached a different conclusion; the 'reasonableness' standard used by the
Tax Court had, by 1980, been officially pronounced dead for sixteen
years. 119 However, the Service's frustration at being thus hoist by its own
petard is understandable, as is its subsequent attempt to reverse U.S.
Steel in regulations. 120 The continued vitality and extensive effect of both
French and U.S. Steel was illustrated in one of the major recent section
482 cases, Bausch & Lomb, Inc. v. Commissioner. 121 In Bausch & Lomb,
the taxpayer (B&L) licensed its unique process for manufacturing soft
contact lenses to an Irish tax haven manufacturer (B&L Ireland) and
charged a royalty of 5 per cent. The Irish subsidiary manufactured the
lenses for US $1.50 each and sold them to the taxpayer for US $7.50
each - the same price charged by unrelated parties with much higher
manufacturing costs for the same product. 122
The Commissioner's proposed adjustments included eliminating the
royalty (on the theory that B&L Ireland was a contract manufacturer
assured of a market for its sales) but adjusting the income to give B&L
Ireland its costs plus a profit of 20 per cent. 123 The Tax Court held that
118
119

120
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these adjustments were an abuse of discretion. In an 86-page long
opinion it first rejected the Service's 'contract manufacturer' analysis
on the grounds that there was no contractual obligation by B&L to
purchase the product (as if such an obligation was needed between
related parties!). 124 Then, the Tax Court held that the transfer price
was correct on the basis of the unrelated sales, despite the economic
differences (volume differences, integrated business differences, and the
fact that B&L had much lower production costs than its competitors)
between the alleged comparables:
We find that use of the comparable uncontrolled price method of determining an arm's length price is mandatory. The third-party transactions
identified by petitioner provide ample evidence that the $7.50 per-lens
price charged by B&L Ireland is equal or below prices which would be
charged for similar lenses in uncontrolled transactions. We place particular reliance on the Second Circuit's opinion in U.S. Steel. To posit that
B&L, the world's largest marketer of soft contact lenses, would be able to
secure a more favorable price from an independent manufacturer who
hoped to establish a long-term relationship with a high volume customer
may be to recognize economic reality, but to do so would cripple a
taxpayer's ability to rely on the comparable uncontrolled price method
in establishing transfer pricing by introducing to it a degree of economic
sophistication which appears reasonable in theory, but which defies
quantification in practice. 125

The court then rejected the argument from disparities of volume and
from the taxpayer's lower costs, holding that the US $7.50 price was 'a
market price' and therefore the taxpayer had 'earned the right to be free
of adjustment' under U.S. Steel. 126 In the second part of its opinion,
the Tax Court applied French and held that the subsequent profitability
of the intangible was irrelevant for establishing a royalty rate, even
though the licensing agreement in Bausch & Lomb (unlike the one in
French) was terminable at will. 127 Accordingly, the court rejected the
taxpayer's 5 per cent and the Service's 27-33 per cent rates and, since
there were predictably no comparables, arbitrarily set its own rate at
20 per cent. 128
The Commissioner appealed and the Second Circuit affirmed. 129
It admitted that 'the Commissioner's position is not without force',
but held that under the regulations and the ALS, applying the
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comparable uncontrolled price method was mandatory, even though
economic reality may differ:
The position urged by the Commissioner would preclude comparability
precisely because the relationship between B&L and B&L Ireland was
different from that between independent buyers and sellers operating at
arm's length. This, however, will always be the case when transactions
between commonly controlled entities are compared to transactions
between independent entities. 130

The IRS position would, in effect, 'nullify' the CUP method. The court
thus felt compelled to affirm that, under the regulations, as long as the
ALS governed, uneconomic results would have to be upheld even though
transactions between related parties cannot realistically be compared
to arm's length transactions. But if that is the case, why should the
ALS apply? 131
French, U.S. Steel and Bausch & Lomb illustrate a major problem in
applying the ALS: if inexact comparables are used because the market
had changed, 132 or because the relationship between the parties makes
for a different nature of transaction, 133 the ALS leads to results that are
completely unrealistic as an economic matter. 134 Why, then, were the
courts in these cases so avid to find that comparables were controlling?
The regulations and precedents applying the ALS provide only partial
answers. The main reason was the courts' stated awareness of the morass
they would be getting into by seeking to determine transfer prices in the
absence of comparables. Decisions (not based on comparables) that
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Ibid. 1091.
The Second Circuit also affirmed the Tax Court's 'best judgment' royalty determination
under a 'not clearly erroneous' standard. The Second Circuit's opinion in Bausch &
Lomb, as well as the Claims Court's opinion in Merck & Co. v. United States, 24 Cl. Ct.
73 (1991), 91-2 USTC 150,456, in effect declare that the ALS is economically if not
legally inapplicable to an integrated multinational. See below.
See RT. French Co., note 106 above, 60 T.C. at 836; Bausch & Lomb, note 121 above, 933
F.2d at 1084.
See U.S. Steel Corp., note 112 above, 617 F.2d at 942; Bausch & Lomb, note 121 above,
933 F.2d at 1084.
Even when the comparables are closer, many adjustments are usually needed. In
Eli Lilly & Co. v. Commissioner, 84 T.C. 996, 1176-86 (1985), for the one year in which
a comparable existed, the Tax Court discussed the necessary adjustments over 11 pages,
and reached the conclusion that a 66 per cent discount from the 'comparable' price was
needed! But cf. Paccar, Inc. v. Commissioner, 85 T.C. 754 (1985) (Tax Court accepted the
taxpayer's proposed comparable with only minimal adjustments).
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cover hundreds of pages only to reach unpredictable and arbitrary
results seem to justify this conclusion.
Cadillac Textiles v. Commissioner135 is an early example of the courts'
predicament in a domestic section 482 case. The case involved commissions paid by the taxpayer to a related entity for weaving. The taxpayer
relied on the comparability of these commissions to those paid to
unrelated entities. 136 The Tax Court, in a memorandum opinion,
held that the alleged comparables were dissimilar because of volume
differences and because there was no commitment for a continuing
relationship - precisely the same factors that should have been applied
in U.S. Steel and Bausch & Lomb. 137 However, having properly struck
down the comparables, and having rejected the Commissioner's allocation as 'heavy handed', the court was faced with the necessity of making
an arbitrary determination of the transfer price:
Where some allocation is justified, if the respondent fails to follow a
reasonable method in making such allocation, the Court must substitute
its judgment ... Unfortunately, this places upon the Court the burden of
decision without having all the facts ... Looking to the combined profits
of both enterprises, and applying [a value added] factor, it is the Court's
conclusion that there should be allocated to the petitioner under section
482 ... the sum of $100,000 [instead of $193,045.37, as proposed by the
Commissioner ]. 138

The Tax Court thus applied a 'profit split', the method later advocated by
the White Paper 139 and ultimately specified in the current regulations. 140
However, as the round figures indicate, 141 the result was largely arbitrary.
In the absence of any guidance in the regulations, the court had little
choice. This explains why other courts were so reluctant to abandon any
comparable, if one could be found. 142
135
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138
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See, e.g., Edwardsv. Commissioner, 67 T.C. 224 (1976). In Edwards, another domestics.
482 case, the Commissioner argued for a profit split, and the Tax Court rejected this
suggestion as incompatible with the ALS, but relied on profits from an uncontrolled
sale: 'The focus is not, as suggested by respondent, on determining an acceptable or
reasonable overall gross profit percentage, but is on determining an arm's length price
for the sale or sales in question by using the gross profit percentage established in an
uncontrolled sale.' Ibid. 236-7.
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The first major international section 482 case from this period, E.I.
DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. United States, 143 was a major victory for the
Service. The facts in DuPont were particularly favourable to the Service,
since the taxpayer admitted that it had set transfer prices with its tax
haven (Swiss) marketing subsidiary, DISA, with no reference to anything
but maximising DISA's profitability. An internal DuPont memo discovered by the Service read:
It would seem to be desirable to bill the tax haven subsidiary at less than
an 'arm's length' price because: (1) the pricing might not be challenged by
the revenue agent; (2) if the pricing is challenged, we might sustain such
transfer prices; (3) if we cannot sustain the prices used, a transfer price
will be negotiated which should not be more than an 'arm's length' price
and might well be less; thus we would be no worse off than we would have
been had we billed at the higher price. 144

In the face of these facts, the taxpayer attempted to show that DISA
met the resale price method of the regulation. The court easily rejected
this argument:
We have itemized the special status of DISA - as a subsidiary intended
and operated to accumulate profits without much regard to the functions
it performed or their real worth- not as direct proof, in itself, supporting
the Commissioner's reallocation of profits under Section 482, but instead
as suggesting the basic reason why plaintiff's sales to DISA were unique
and without any direct comparable in the real world . . . the vital
prerequisite for applying the resale price method is the existence of
substantially comparable uncontrolled resellers . . . there is nothing in
the record showing the degree of similarity called for by the regulation. 145

The court, having rejected the taxpayer's comparables (drawn largely
from general industry averages and the IRS Sourcebook of Statistics of
Income), was faced with the necessity of either determining its own
transfer price, or accepting the Service's allocation. Unlike the court in
Cadillac Textiles, this court decided to take the easier route and accept
the Service's position:
The amount of reallocation would not be easy for us to calculate if we
were called upon to do it ourselves, but Section 482 gives that power to
the Commissioner and we are content that his amount (totaling some
$18 million) was within the zone of reasonableness. 146
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In determining reasonableness, the court relied on ratios of gross
income to total operating costs for functionally similar corporations,
and on rates of return for 1,100 corporations in general, 147 thus prefiguring the methods of the recently issued proposed, temporary and final
regulations. 148 However, there was no suggestion that this reallocation
constituted an application of the ALS. The opinion drew a spirited
concurrence from Judge Nichols, who pointed out some of the problems
with the court's approach:
The evidence referred to supports [the result] in the weakest possible way,
[we are] making bricks without straw. Assuming, still, that no formula
prescribed by regulation can be used, if the Commissioner adheres in
court to his original method, it would seem we would have to affirm him
unless we thought his choice of method arbitrary and capricious. It is not
surprising, therefore, that taxpayer's able counsel here put all his chips on
the regulatory resale price method, to the virtual exclusion of any reliance
on any 'fourth method', really a chaos of any and all methods. Whether
the involved regulations leave too many cases for the fourth method is a
question the court touches on lightly. The congressional request to write
regulations to govern these section 482 reallocations is one sentence long:
[']It is believed that the Treasury should explore the possibility of
developing and promulgating regulations under this authority [section
482] which would provide additional guidelines and formulas for the
allocation of income and deductions in cases involving foreign income.[']
Clearly the result of our decision is that this has not been done in respect
to the reallocation here involved, and it remains in the almost if not
wholly unreviewable discretion of the Treasury, as it was when the
suggestion was made. [The Treasury] should not have discretion to
decide how much money anyone should have to pay to support the
government. 149

DuPont was the last major international section 482 decision in which
the Service was the clear victor. The 1980s, starting with the Second
Circuit's reversal in U.S. Steel, saw a series of section 482 related disasters
for the IRS. In 1983, for instance, the Tax Court decided Hospital Corp.
of America v. Commissioner. 150 Here, the taxpayer formed a Cayman
Islands subsidiary to perform a contract to manage a hospital in Saudi
Arabia. The subsidiary (LTD) performed 'minimal' functions, and all the
147
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substantial work on the contract was done by the taxpayer. The Commissioner argued that LTD was a sham, or alternatively, that all of its
income should be allocated to the taxpayer. 151 The Tax Court, in an 82page opinion, rejected both arguments. It held that LTD was not a sham
because it 'actually carried on some minimal amount of business activity' and had officers and directors who negotiated the contract, even
though the same persons were also officers and directors of the taxpayer. 152 On the section 482 issue, the court held that the Commissioner
abused his discretion by the 100 per cent allocation, because this represented a repetition of the 'sham' argument. 153 Since there were no
comparables suggested by any side, the court was forced to make an
arbitrary profit split determination:
Even though we have rejected respondent's 100 percent allocation of
taxable income from LTD to petitioner, the evidence indicates overwhelmingly that an allocation is necessary and proper in this case.
Unfortunately, there is little quantitative evidence in this record upon
which we can determine what a reasonable allocation of profits would be.
Neither party has been particularly helpful to the Court in this regard.
However, we must do the best with what we have. Using our best
judgment on the lengthy and inconclusive record before us, we have
concluded and found as a fact that 75 percent of the taxable income of
LTD in 1973 was attributable to petitioner. 154

While a 75 per cent allocation may seem favourable to the Service, on
the facts of the case, a 100 per cent allocation would have been justified,
since LTD, in effect, performed no economic functions whatsoever. Not
surprisingly, the proposed regulations attempted to reverse the result
in this case. 155 The next debacle for the Service was Eli Lilly & Co. v.
Commissioner, 156 which resulted in a particularly length Tax Court
opinion of 196 pages. Lilly was one of a series of cases concerning
transfers, by pharmaceutical giants, of valuable patents developed as a
result of extensive domestic research and development in the United
States. Thereafter, the patents were transferred on a tax-free basis to
Puerto Rican subsidiaries who could reap their rewards and benefit from
151
155
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See Treas. Reg. s. l.482-2(b)(8) (intangible regulations should apply in such cases of
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84 T.C. 996 (1985), aff'd in part, rev'd in part and remanded, 856 F.2d 855 (7th Cir.
1988).
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Puerto Rico's tax haven status. As an economic matter, there was no
justification for letting the Puerto Rican subsidiary reap the rewards of
the research done by the taxpayer without paying any royalty or other
consideration for the patents. 157
The taxpayer organised the subsidiary, Lilly P.R., in 1965, after having
developed certain extremely lucrative patented processes. It transferred
the patents to Lilly P.R., which relied on the patents to become the sole
manufacturer of two drugs, Darvon and Darvon-N. Lilly P.R. then sold
these drugs to the taxpayer, who in turn marketed the products throughout the United States. 158 The Commissioner reallocated the entire
income from the patents to the taxpayer, arguing that Lilly P.R. was a
mere contract manufacturer and that its ownership of the intangibles
should be disregarded. The Tax Court rejected this approach, holding
that the legal ownership of the intangibles could not be disregarded. 159 It
also rejected the Commissioner's argument that the separation of
income from expenses to create the patents led to a distortion, mainly
because the expenses were incurred largely in the 1950s, long before the
transfer, and had been recovered previously. 160
The Tax Court then reached the issue of proper transfer pricing under
the ALS. The prices paid by the taxpayer were such that it could not
use the profits to fund its current R&D. The Tax Court held that this was
unacceptable: 'It is inconceivable that petitioner, negotiating at arm's
length, would have transferred valuable income-producing intangibles
without a royalty, lump-sum payment, or other agreement that would
enable petitioner to continue its general research and development
activities.' 161 Thus, some section 482 allocation was necessary. However,
as the drugs had been patented for two of the years in question, there
were no comparables. Hence, the three regular methods (CUP, cost plus
and resale price) were inapplicable. Having rejected both parties' expert
witnesses, the court was obliged to determine an arbitrary 'reasonable
profit split' based on the functions performed by the parties. Under the
profit split, the court allocated to Lilly P.R. 100 per cent of manufacturing costs plus location savings, and 55 per cent of its income from
marketing intangibles. 162 The result was a reallocation to the taxpayer
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of US $23 million for the 1971-2 tax years, instead of US $53 million as
advocated by the Commissioner. 163
Both parties appealed. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
reached a result which was even more favourable to the taxpayer. 164 It
rejected the Tax Court's argument that Lilly would not have transferred
the patents to an unrelated party without getting enough consideration
to fund its ongoing R&D, holding that the stock of Lilly P.R. received by
the taxpayer, together with distribution rights and technical assistance
contracts, constituted sufficient consideration. 165 The Court of Appeals,
nevertheless, approved the profit split method as 'not unreasonable', but
remanded for an adjustment that did not require Lilly P.R. to participate
in the taxpayer's R&D expenses. 166 It took the 1986 amendments to
section 482 to rea<,:h a more economically reasonable result. 167
The Service fared even worse in G. D. Searle & Co. v. Commissioner, 168
the companion case to Lilly. Like Lilly, Searle transferred drug patents to
its Puerto Rican subsidiary (SCO) for no consideration; however, SCO
subsequently manufactured and sold the drugs to unrelated parties so no
transfer price issue was involved. The Tax O;mrt rejected the Service's
attempt to ignore the transfer of the intangibles and allocate the income
to the taxpayer by treating SCO as a contract manufacturer. 169 The court
then held that some consideration for the transfer was necessary as the
intangibles accounted for 80 per cent of the taxpayer's income and
transferring the patents to an unrelated party solely for stock would be
'the height of corporate mismanagement'. 170 As there were no comparables, the Tax Court was required to use its arbitrary 'best judgment' and
allocated to the taxpayer US $29 and US $34 million for the two years in
question (25 per cent of SCO's total net sales), compared to the US $92
and US $110 million sought by the Service. 171 Significantly, the court did
not attempt to characterise this result as the product of an arm's length
allocation; instead, the court reasoned 'arm's length consideration for
section 482 purposes is that which results in a clear reflection of
income'. 172 This remarkable tautology (the standard for clear reflection
is arm's length, and arm's length is whatever results in clear reflection)
marks a low point in the courts' attempts to apply the ALS in the absence
of arm's length transactions.
163
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The Service fared equally badly in its attempts to avoid the results of
its own regulations in Ciba-Geigy Corp. v. Commissioner, 173 an inbound
section 482 case. The case involved the appropriate rate of royalty to be
paid by the taxpayer to its Swiss parent under an exclusive licence in
which all the significant R&D had been done at the parent level. The
Service argued the taxpayer was engaged in a joint venture with the
parent and should have paid a lower royalty than 10 per cent or,
alternatively, the arm's length rate was lower. The taxpayer argued for a
higher royalty than 10 per cent. The Tax Court rejected the Service's
attempts 'to deflect the thrust of his own "transfer or use of intangible
property" regulations ... which to respondent's discomfiture fit this case
like a glove'. 174 Having rejected both parties' proposed comparables
(because of different degrees of risk and the uniqueness of the relationship), the court held that the 10 per cent rate was reasonable, based on
the 'substantial negotiations' between the related parties 175 and the
testimony of an unrelated party who would have paid between 10 and
12.5 per cent for a non-exclusive licence. 176 The Service's position in this
case seems unreasonable, and a higher royalty rate should have been
allowed, based on the unexpected profitability of the patent, the difference between exclusive and non-exclusive licences, and the fact the
parent performed the R&D.
The same arbitrariness and disregard for economic reality persists in
two other recent section 482 cases which were decided, like Bausch &
Lomb, after the publication of the White Paper: Sundstrand Corp. v.
Commissioner 177 and Merck & Co. Inc. v. United States. 178 Sundstrand
involved the licence of valuable manufacturing technology for aircraft
spare parts to the taxpayer's Singapore subsidiary which in turn sold the
parts to the taxpayer for distribution. The Service again attempted to
apply its contract manufacturer analysis which seems appropriate
because the subsidiary did not develop the product and was guaranteed,
although not formally, to sell its products to the taxpayer (the airlines
actually refused to buy from the subsidiary directly). The Tax Court,
relying on Bausch & Lomb, rejected this analysis and also rejected all of
the taxpayer's and the Service's proposed comparables. 179 Having criticised the parties for their 'contentiousness' and lack of cooperation, 180
the court made its own 'best estimate' of the appropriate transfer price,
173
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relying on the discounts given by the taxpayer on other products and on
its representations to US Customs. 181 These bases seem both arbitrary
and unrelated to the issue facing the court. With respect to the royalty,
the court again rejected all comparables and arbitrarily fixed a rate of 10
per cent. 182
Merck & Co. Inc. v. United States, 183 a case similar to G.D. Searle, is yet
another recent section 482 defeat for the Service. In Merck, the taxpayer
developed drugs and transferred the patents to its Puerto Rican subsidiary, MSDQ, which manufactured and sold the drugs to unrelated
parties. The Service argued MSDQ should have paid the taxpayer a
royalty fot its R&D and marketing assistance. The Claims Court rejected
the Service's position in its entirety, and ordered a refund to the taxpayer
of US $5 million, plus interest. 184 The court recognised the location of
the patents within the group had no business consequences, 185 but held
the transfer of the intangibles valid. 186 The court found no continued
royalty was required since the costs of R&D had been recovered before
the transfer. 187 The court further found that the taxpayer did not provide
any marketing services to MSDQ, despite the overlap of officers and
directors and the functional integration between the two companies. 188
The court recognised, as an economic matter, that its decision was
untenable, but felt obliged to make it in view of the 'all or nothing'
positions of the parties.
For tax years 1972 through 1976, MSDQ reported taxable income that
totalled US $181,802,000. Federal income tax paid was US $657,000. The
pricing process that produces such disparity between costs of production
and end-product prices, and permits the accumulation of retained
earnings that amount to 98.82 percent of all reported taxable income,
may be economically unjustified or socially unacceptable. Such results
may underscore infirmities in the controls to be expected in regulated
pharmaceutical markets. Such results do not establish a distortion of
income as to MSDQ. Such problems cannot be addressed through
section 482, under the statute and regulations as presently written. 189
Thus, the court ignored the analysis in G.D. Searle, that no party
would transfer the intangibles to an unrelated party without
181
185
189
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consideration. 190 Although this seems facially unjustifiable, any attempt
to find the proper royalty rate (if required, since there could be no
comparables) in the absence of 'some formula or method' 191 must have
appeared equally frustrating to the court. What makes Merck remarkable
is that arm's length analysis did not enter the court's opinion at all. The
only issue discussed was whether Merck performed R&D and marketing
functions for MSDQ, not whether it would have transferred the patents
to an unrelated party. By ignoring arm's length, the Claims Court in
effect held the standard is inapplicable to an integrated multinational
enterprise like Merck, which can shift its intangibles around as it
wishes. 192
Merck and Bausch & Lomb thus mark the end of a process in which the
ALS became increasingly irrelevant to section 482 cases. The result
demonstrated that the then governing statute and regulations required
changing to reflect the economic reality of multinationals. Since 1982,
this task has been undertaken by Congress and the Service in the recent
proposed, temporary and final regulations, leading to the abandonment
of the traditional and narrow ALS for the vast majority of section
482 cases.
3.5

Fall (1992-1994)

In 1982, Congress began closing some of the loopholes that were evident
in the section 482 cases. The Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act
(TEFRA) altered the treatment of income attributable to intangible
assets owned or leased by possessions corporations benefitting from
190
191
192

G.D. Searle, note 104 above, 88 T.C. at 370
Merck, note 178 above, 24 Cl. Ct. at 86.
In Proctor & Gamble Co. v. Commissioner, 95 T.C. 323 (1990), aff'd, 961 F.2d 1255 (6th
Cir. 1992), the Tax Court reversed the Commissioner's s. 482 royalty allocation from
P&G Spain to its Swiss parent, which had provided P&G Spain with substantial
technical assistance, because P&G Spain was forbidden from paying royalties under
Spanish law. This case illustrated the irrelevance of the ALS; clearly, no unrelated party
would have provided the assistance to P&G Spain knowing it could not be paid under
Spanish law. The issue under s. 482 should be the economic allocation of income, not
whether a royalty could by paid. For a similar result under even more egregious
circumstances, see Exxon Corp. v. Commissioner, 66 T.C.M. (CCH) 1707 (1993), where
the Tax Court refused to allow the Service to allocate intercompany oil sales between
Exxon subsidiaries based on Saudi Arabian price controls set, at the time, below the
prevailing market price. Ibid. 1760. Exxon thus escaped the effect of the price restrictions on its income allocation despite demonstrations made by the Service that Exxon
had flouted those restrictions. Ibid. 1752-60.
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section 936 of the Code. TEFRA amended section 936 to provide that
such income would be treated as income of the corporation's US shareholders unless the corporation elected to make cost sharing payments to
its parent or to split the profit from products produced in the possession
of the parent on an equal basis. 193 In passing TEFRA, Congress sought to
redress the distortion of income resulting from the separation of R&D
activity and the income derived from the intangible. 194 Thus, the specific
Puerto Rican affiliate problem of Lilly, G.D. Searle and Merck was
addressed, but only for post -1982 transfers with no inference regarding
prior law.
The next step was taken in the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, which
amended section 367(d) to treat a tax-free transfer of intangibles to
related foreign corporations as a sale of the intangible for annual payments over the useful life of the property contingent on its productivity,
use or disposition. 195 However, no inference was intended for licences of
intangibles, which continued to be governed by section 482. By 1985,
Congress realised U.S. Steel and Lilly indicated something should be
done about the general application of section 482 of the Code, beyond
the specific issues of Puerto Rican corporations or transfers to foreign
affiliates. The House Report on House Bill 3838 states the problem as
follows:
Many observers have questioned the effectiveness of the 'arm's length'
approach of the regulations under section 482. A recurrent problem is the
absence of comparable arm's length transactions between unrelated
parties, and the inconsistent results of attempting to impose an arm's
length concept in the absence of comparables.
A fundamental problem is the fact that the relationship between
related parties is different from that of unrelated parties. Observers have
noted that multinational companies operate as an economic unit, and
not 'as if' they were unrelated to their foreign subsidiaries. In addition,
a parent corporation that transfers potentially valuable property to its
subsidiary is not faced with the same risks as if it were dealing with
an unrelated party. Its equity interest assures it of the ability ultimately
to obtain the benefit of future anticipated or unanticipated profits,
without regard to the price it sets. The relationship similarly would
enable the parent to adjust its arrangement each year, if it wished to
193
194

195
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do so, to take account of major variations in the revenue produced by
a transferred item.
Certain judicial interpretations of section 482 suggest that pricing
arrangements between unrelated parties for items of the same apparent
general category as those involved in the related party transfer may in
some circumstances be considered a 'safe harbor' for related party
pricing arrangements, even though there are significant differences in
the volume and risks involved, or in other factors. See, e.g., United States
Steel. While the committee is concerned that such decisions may unduly
emphasize the concept of comparables even in situations involving highly
standardized commodities or services, it believes that such an approach
is sufficiently troublesome where transfers of intangibles are concerned
that a statutory modification to the intercompany pricing rules regarding
transfers of intangibles is necessary. 196

The specific solution proposed by the House bill, however, was relatively narrow. It would have added the following sentence to section 482:
'in the case of any transfer (or license) of intangible property (within the
meaning of section 936(h)(3)(B)), the income with respect to such
transfer or license shall be commensurate with the income attributable
to the intangible'. 197 Other than rejecting the approaches of French and
U.S. Steel, no attempt to modify section 482 more extensively along the
lines suggested in the House Report was forthcoming.
Nevertheless, it is noticeable that the House did not pretend that the
'commensurate with income' standard was compatible with the ALS.
The Report states the transferor of intangibles in a multinational was
looking to its equity investment, 'rather than to "arm's length" factors',
to recuperate its cost 198 and that 'industry norms or other unrelated
party transactions do not provide a safe harbor minimum payment for
related party intangible transfers'. 199 Thus, even if a perfect comparable
could be found in which the same intangible was transferred to an
unrelated party in the same circumstances for a fixed royalty rate, the
provision would still require the allocation of 'super-royalties' to a
related party transferor.
The conference agreement on the Tax Reform Act of 1986 followed the
House bill except for the expansion of the 'commensurate with income'

196
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H.R. Rep. No. 426, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 423-4 (1985) (footnote omitted).
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199
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provisions to apply to inbound as well as outbound transfers 200 such as
the transfer in Ciba-Geigy. However, the report added the following
significant language:
The conferees are also aware that many important and difficult issues
under section 482 are left unresolved by this legislation. The conferees
believe that a comprehensive study of intercompany pricing rules by the
Internal Revenue Service should be conducted and that careful consideration should be given to whether the existing regulations could be
modified in any respect. 201

In light of this language, the report should be seen as an invitation to
the Service to shift the focus of the regulations away from the ALS. The
result of this invitation was the 1988 White Paper, 202 the 1992 proposed
regulations, 203 the 1993 temporary regulations, 204 and the 1994 final
regulations under section 482 of the Code. 205
In discussing the White Paper, it is necessary to distinguish between
what it does and what it says it does. First, the White Paper does contain
an excellent analysis of the evolution of the statute, the regulations, and
the case law under section 482 of the Code, 206 as well as an overview of
the Service's experience in administering the law and regulations. 207 The
analysis suggests that the regulations rely too heavily on finding comparables,208 that the case law indicates that the regulations 'fail to resolve the
most significant and potentially abusive fact patterns', 209 and that the
'fourth method' developed in the courts has been inadequate. 210
After explaining the 1986 changes, 211 the White Paper reaches the
heart of the matter: determining what method should apply to section
482 issues in the absence of comparables. It rejects the applicability of
safe harbours because they will only serve as a 'floor' for taxpayers
unable to obtain better results otherwise. 212 The White Paper instead
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suggests two methods based on determining appropriate returns from a
functional analysis of the parties' respective economic contributions. 213
The first or 'basic' method applies when one party does not use
significant intangibles of its own. 214 The economic functions of that
party are analysed and appropriate rates of return are identified based
on the rates of return of unrelated parties performing similar activities
and assuming similar risks. 215 The residual is then assigned to the other
party.216
The second or 'profit split' method applies when both parties perform complex economic functions, bear significant economic risks, and
use significant self-developed intangibles. 217 After applying the basic
method to the measurable assets of both parties, the residual is allocated between them by splitting the profits based on the relative values
of each party's intangibles. 218 The White Paper acknowledges that
'splitting the intangible income in such cases will largely be a matter
of judgment'. 219
This is what the White Paper proposes. The Paper, however, also has
another agenda: to portray its suggested methods as compatible with the
traditional ALS. 220 This agenda developed because of the strong objections by our trading partners to the language contained in the 1986
legislative history advocating the abandonment of the ALS. 221 Thus, as
we saw above, the White Paper recommends that the United States
continue to adhere to the ALS? 22 Furthermore, the methods summarised above (including profit split) were given the name 'basic arm's
length return method' (BALRM). 223 Finally, the White Paper contains
one chapter devoted to demonstrating the compatibility of the 'commensurate with income' standard and the BALRM method with the
ALS, 224 one chapter defending the ALS on economic grounds, 225 and
an appendix attempting to demonstrate that other countries use
methods which are similar to BALRM. 226
The White Paper also contains one real concession to the ALS in that
it permits taxpayers to avoid periodic adjustments to a royalty rate for
intangibles if they can find a comparable lacking such adjustments. 227
This provision flies in the face of the statutory language and the
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legislative history of the 1986 amendments, 228 but the Treasury presumably felt it could not claim to be adhering to the ALS without allowing
taxpayers to use comparables if they found them. Indeed, under the
White Paper's proposed 'clear and convincing evidence' standard, such
comparables in practice will be hard to find. 229 Whether the BALRM
itself is compatible with the ALS depends upon which definition of the
ALS is used. The White Paper relies on the 1979 OECD Report on
transfer pricing, which permits 'some regard to the profits of the relevant
[multinational enterprise]' in determining transfer prices in the absence
of comparables. 230 However, this language falls far short of endorsing the
use of either the profit split method advocated by the White Paper or the
industry average rates of return. 231
It is difficult to see in what way the BALRM can meaningfully be called
an ALS method in the traditional sense. First, since BALRM by definition can only be applied in the absence of comparables, it falls outside
the traditional definition of the ALS, which relies on comparables. Thus,
BALRM can only be called an 'arm's length method' if the definition of
what constitutes 'arm's length methods' is expanded to include any
method that reaches results that are the same as those that would have
been reached by unrelated parties. If this is the definition, then 'arm's
length' includes the entire transfer pricing continuum, including formulary apportionment, because even pure formulary apportionment may,
in appropriate cases, reach the same results as would have been reached
by unrelated parties dealing at arm's length.
Second, even if one assumes arm's length dealings proceed from such
a functional analysis as envisaged by the BALRM, such an analysis could
never lead the parties to a definite fixed transfer price. As Langbein has
argued, it could only lead to a range between the minimum the selling
party could expect to get based on its costs and the maximum the
buying party would be willing to pay based on its resale price. In most
related-party contexts, there will be a residual profit not allocable to any
228
229

230
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constituent member, but rather to the existence of the overall organisation.232 Thus, unlike a comparable with a fixed price, applying the
BALRM between unrelated parties, at best, could lead to a range of
acceptable transfer prices. However, the disparity between one end of
the range (advocated by the taxpayer) and the other (advocated by the
Service) could still be immense. Furthermore, the disparity can only be
resolved by applying profit split methods which do not depend on
comparables and, hence, fall outside the traditional ALS.
Thus, the true message of the White Paper was that the traditional
ALS could not be applied to the majority of section 482 cases because no
comparables could be found. What the White Paper instead achieved
was to substitute an expanded definition of the ALS for the traditional
one: ALS was now understood to include not only CUP, cost plus and
resale price but also the rest of the transfer pricing continuum, up to and
including profit split, as long as the results reached were compatible with
arm's length results. This expansion of the scope of arm's length was the
major achievement of the White Paper and constituted a revolution in
the United States' approach to transfer pricing. The full fruits of such
revolution can be seen in the 1994 final regulations. 233
The methods that the White Paper suggested as a replacement for the
traditional ALS, however, have at least two flaws which have been
pointed out repeatedly since 1988. 234 First, BALRM analysis is extremely
complicated and requires massive input by economists and accountants,
as well as access to a large fund of not easily available information. 235
Second, even where the method is applied correctly, it still leaves a
substantial residual to be split in many cases, and the White Paper
provided no guidance on the ways to split it. The BALRM was thus
unlikely to reduce the amount of section 482 litigation or the length of
the ensuing opinions because the economists of the Service and the
taxpayer predictably differ. When millions of dollars are involved, as is
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the case in most major section 482 cases, the matter is likely to end up in
court. In fact, functional analysis was included in the IRS manual and
applied before 1988, with no discernible lessening of the section 482
.. .
236
l 1t1gatwn mess.
By 1992, these drawbacks of BALRM persuaded the Service it could
not be applied in practice. As a result, when, in accordance with the 1986
legislative history, the proposed regulations came out in January 1992,
they made no attempt to implement the White Paper. The Preamble to
the proposed regulations states that:
Many comments on the White Paper criticised the prominent role given
to BALRM, arguing that BALRM would be difficult to apply because the
information BALRM required generally would not be available, would be
unfair to corporations whose rates of return vary considerably from the
average, and would allocate too much income to U.S. entities. The Service
also was urged to assign a greater role to inexact comparable transactions
and to reconsider the use of safe harbor rules. These comments were
taken into account in the development of the three pricing methods
described in these proposed regulations.Z 37

Instead of BALRM, the proposed regulations introduced the
'comparable profit interval' ( CPI) method, 238 which represented another
step towards the demise of the traditional ALS as the guiding standard
for applying section 482 of the Code.
The proposed regulations were divided into three parts: intangibles,
tangibles and cost sharing. In the case of transfers of intangibles through
transfers of tangibles or services, the intangible rules applied if the
income attributable to the intangible was 'material' in relation to the
income attributable to the tangible property or services. 239 In the case of
intangibles, when a strictly defined 'matching transaction' involving the
same intangible under the same or substantially similar economic conditions and contractual terms was lacking, 240 the next method in order
of priority was the 'comparable adjustable transaction' (CAT)
method. 241 Under the CAT method, the arm's length consideration was
determined 'by reference to the consideration charged in an
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uncontrolled transfer involving the same or similar intangible under
adjustable economic conditions and contractual terms'. 242 To be considered adjustable, the contractual terms and economic conditions must
be sufficiently similar such that the effect of any material differences can
be determined with reasonable accuracy; 243 however, even if all the other
conditions for applying the CAT method are met, 'an uncontrolled
transfer will not meet the standards [of the CAT method) if the consideration determined by reference to that transfer results in a level of
operating income for the tested party ... that is outside of the compar.
1'244
able pro fi t mterva
.
In the case of transfers of tangible property, the first method to be applied
was the CUP method. 245 Under the CUP method, the consideration for
tangible property was determined by considering uncontrolled transfers of
the same or similar physical property in the same or similar circumstances if
any differences could be reflected by a reasonable number of price adjustments.246 The CUP method was the only method for tangibles not subject
to verification by means of the CPl. 247 When the CUP method was unavailable, other methods such as resale price, cost plus or 'fourth method' could
be used, but the results from these methods were all subject to testing under
the CPI and the ultimate method used was supposed to reach results at the
'most appropriate point' within the CPI. 248
The CPI itself was constructed in a series of steps. First, the tested
party was selected. 249 Second, the 'applicable business classification' of
the tested party was determined on the basis of the businesses whose
operations most closely corresponded to the tested operations involving
related parties. 250 Third, constructive operating incomes were derived by
applying profit level indicators from a selection of uncontrolled taxpayers in the applicable business classification to financial data of the tested
operations. 251 These profit level indicators included the rate of return on
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assets, ratio of operating income to sales, and profit splits. Fourth, the
CPI was determined on the basis of profit level indicators on the basis of
complex statistical techniques.Z 52 Fifth, the 'most appropriate point' in
the CPI was determined on the basis of other statistical techniques. 253
Finally, the transfer price was determined so as to produce operating
income for the tested party which equalled the constructive operating
income corresponding to the most appropriate point in the CPI. 254 In
general, the CPI was to be constructed based on actual, rather than
projected, results from the three-year period beginning with the year
prior to the one under review. 255
Is the CPI method of the proposed regulations compatible with the
traditional ALS? As our trading partners promptly pointed out, the
answer is no, 256 even under the Treasury's own definition of what
constitutes an ALS method. 257 This definition of an ALS method was
based on the definition offered in a 1979 OECD Report which endorsed
the ALS and explicitly rejected formulary approaches for allocating
profits between related enterprises as 'necessarily arbitrary'. 258 It
accepted, however, the possibility that 'in seeking to arrive at an arm's
length price in a range of transactions, some regard to the total profits of
the relevant [multinational enterprise] may ... be helpful, as a check on
the assessment of the arm's length price'. 259
As the White Paper recognised, the OECD Report endorsed methods
which consider the profits of the related enterprises in making arm's
length determinations. 260 The CPI method, on the other hand, looked
exclusively at the profits of other taxpayers to determine the proper
allocation within the controlled group. 261 The CPI then judged the results
of any method of allocation which, in the case of intangibles, did not meet
strict standards of comparability as a 'matching transaction', 262 or, in the
case of tangibles, was not based on a 'comparable uncontrolled price'. 263
252
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If the results of any such method did not fall within the CPI, the transfer
price was not considered 'arm's length'. 264 The CPI method thus fell
squarely within the definition of a 'global' or formulary method under
the OECD Report, since it disregarded the transaction between the related
parties altogether and substituted a transaction based on an analysis of the
profits of third parties. 265 While the CPI method did rely on comparables
(unlike the BALRM with profit split, which the proposed regulations
rejected), the standard of comparison used was so loose that our trading
partners refused to consider it an 'arm's length' method. 266
The proposed regulations thus marked a further step in the decline
and fall of the traditional ALS based on com parables for the majority of
section 482 cases. They would have also likely led to increased double
taxation in the absence of agreements with our trading partners.
This alone would not necessarily have been enough to condemn them.
The proposed regulations, however, were also incompatible with the
legislative history of the 1986 amendments (on which they relied for
authority), which clearly states 'industry norms' should not be the basis
• d etermmmg
. . trans £er pnces.
. 267 M ore tmportant
.
1y, as many commen10r
tators have pointed out, the proposed regulations suffered from other
flaws as well. First, they were incredibly complex, requiring the application of statistical methods far beyond the understanding of most tax
directors of even the largest corporations. This could have forced taxpayers to devote resources to employing economists and statisticians,
rather than in more productive ways. Second, the proposed regulations
relied on the ability of taxpayers to obtain information regarding the
profitability of their competitors, which was unobtainable without
breaching antitrust laws. 268 Third, these regulations were unlikely to
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Prop. Treas. Reg. s. 1.482-2(£)(1), 57 Fed. Reg. 3571, 3586 (30 January 1992).
OECD Report, note 230 above, p. 19. The effect of the arm's length approach advocated
by the OECD Report is 'to recognize the actual transactions as the starting point for tax
assessment and not, in other than exceptional cases, to substitute other transactions for
them'. Ibid.
For an analysis of the reactions of trading partners, see 'International Chamber of
Commerce Opposing Proposed Transfer Pricing Rules, 69 Daily Tax Rep. (BNA), 9 April
1992, G7; 'Proposed Transfer Pricing Regulations Could Spark Tax War, Experts Say',
115 Daily Tax Rep. (BNA), 15 June 1992, Gl. See also 'U.S. Trading Partners Respond
Favorably to Proposed Section 482 Regs' 95 Tax Notes Today, 11 March 1992, 55-17
(a somewhat misleading title in light of the reactions actually reported).
See H.R. Rep. No. 426 at 425.
'International Chamber of Commerce Opposing Proposed Transfer Pricing Rules', note
266 above.
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lead to any significant reduction in litigation, given the many subjective
decisions involved in their application (e.g., the selection of the tested
party) and the many undefined terms (e.g., 'material') that they include.
Finally, the proposed regulations were totally useless as a planning tool
for taxpayers, because in order to construct the CPI, they required a
clairvoyant knowledge of actual future results. 269
In light of this uniformly negative reaction, the IRS rapidly realised a
different direction had to be taken. 270 The tesult was the current
temporary and final regulations which, on their face, appear to signal a
substantial retreat by the IRS and a reaffirmation of the viability of the
ALS. These appearances are, however, misleading. Closer examination
reveals the temporary and final regulations will probably ensure the CPI
(renamed the comparable profit method, or CPM) will be the method
applied in the majority of disputed cases by the IRS to judge whether the
transfer price should be adjusted, while in other cases a profit split
method similar to BALRM, which does not rely on comparables at all,
will be used. 271
The temporary regulations, like the proposed regulations, began with
the required lip service to the ALS, and omitted the modifications to
the ALS that attracted criticism in the proposed regulations. 272
269
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See generally New York State Bar Assoc. Tax Section, Comments on Proposed Section
482 and Cost Sharing Regulations, 9 September 1992; D. Kevin Dolan, 'Proposed
Transfer Pricing and Cost Sharing Regulations' (1992) 21 Tax Mgmt Int'l J 171;
Elizabeth King, 'The Section 482 White Paper and the Proposed Regulations:
A Comparison of Key Provisions' (1992) 4 Tax Notes Int'l 331, 334; Steven P. Hannes,
'An Examination of the New U.S. Transfer Pricing Proposals' (1992) 4 Tax Notes Int'l
281, 282; James P. Fuller and Ernest F. Aud, Jr, 'The Proposed Section 482 Regulations'
(1992) 4 Tax Notes Int'l 599, 600.
'Service Promises Section 482 Review, Leniency Administrating Payroll Tax Rules' 92
Tax Notes Today, 3 September 1992, 180-1.
For analyses of the temporary regulations see J. P. Fuller and E. F. Aud, Jr, 'The New
Temporary and Proposed Section 482 Regulations: A Wolf in Sheep's Clothing?' (1993)
6 Tax Notes Int'l 525; S. P. Hannes, 'An Evaluation of IRS's 1993 Transfer Pricing and
Related Penalty Proposals: Round Three' (1993) 6 Tax Notes Int'l 397; V. Zonana,
Section 482: The 1993 Regulations - Once More, With Feeling!, Tax Club Paper (9
February 1993).
Temp. Treas. Reg. s. 1.482-1T(b)(l) (1993); Treas. Reg. ss. 1.482-1(b)(1)-(2) (emphasising 'arm's length results'). Compare with Prop. Treas. Reg. s. 1.482-1(b)(1), 57 Fed.
Reg. 3571, 3578 (30 January 1992), which subjected the ALS to a 'sound business
judgment on the basis of reasonable levels of experience' test, the 'reasonableness' test
of Frank v. International Canadian Corp., 308 F.2d 520, 528-529 (9th cir. 1962), which
had been rejected by the Service since 1935. See notes 43-7 above and accompanying
text.
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However, the temporary regulations also subjected the ALS to a 'best
method rule', which is retained in the final regulations, and will be an
exception that swallows the traditional ALS. The best method rule
(BMR) states that when the taxpayer and the Service disagree about
the pricing methods to be used in reaching ALS results, the method to
be used is the one that provides the 'most accurate determination' of
the arm's length result. 273 The factors to be weighed when choosing the
method under BMR are the completeness and accuracy of the data, the
degree of comparability with uncontrolled transactions, the number,
magnitude and accuracy of adjustments, and whether the result agrees
with any other method. 274
How will the BMR be applied in practice? The answer was provided in
the examples given in the temporary regulations. The first example
involves a non-controversial case where the taxpayer is able to provide
a comparable CUP method that fits the transaction 'with a small number
of minor adjustments'. 275 In this case, the BMR will allow the CUP
method to overcome the resale price method proposed by the IRS. 276
This first example presupposed an exact comparable exists, but, as the
cases surveyed above indicate, no such comparable can be found in
the vast majority of real-life situations involving a dispute between the
Service and the taxpayer. In such a case, the second example comes into
play. Here, the taxpayer argues for CUP with 'several adjustments' which
are not major ones while the Service argues for the resale price method.
The CPM method, which is equivalent to CPI, reaches results that are
consistent with resale price; therefore, the example indicates the similar
results achieved by the resale price method and the CPM overcome the
taxpayer's comparable. 277
As Fuller and Aud suggest, this example 'borders on the 1992
proposed regulations' requirement that the resale price method be
tested and pass muster under the CPI'. 278 In effect, whenever the IRS
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Temp. Treas. Reg. s. 1.482-1T(b)(2)(iii) (1994); Treas. Reg. s. 1.482-1(c).
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Ibid.
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Temp. Treas. Reg. s. 1.482-1T(b)(2)(iii)(C), Example 1 (1993); cf. Treas. Reg. s.1.482-8,
Example 1.
277
Ibid.
Temp. Treas. Reg. s. 1.482-1T(b)(2)(iii)(C), Example 2 (1993).
Fuller and Aud, 'The New Temporary and Proposed Section 482 Regulations', note 271
above, 527. The example was dropped from the final regulations, but under the
examples that were included, the CUP (and CUT for intangibles) apply only where
identical comparables are found, so that the CPM will apply in most cases under the
BMR. See Treas. Reg. s. 1.482-8.
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and the taxpayer disagree about the pricing method, which is essentially
in every case in which the application of the ALS is important, the
two competing methods have to be tested under the CPM. Although
the temporary regulations refrained from mandating, they strongly
suggested that the method that is consistent with the CPM should
prevail. Thus, in the temporary regulations, as in the proposed regulations, unless the taxpayer can find an exact comparable or one that
requires only minor adjustments, the CPM will be used to 'trump' any
taxpayer method (including the CUP) that is inconsistent with its
results. 279
The conclusion that the temporary regulations represent only a tactical retreat by the IRS from the proposed regulations' emphasis on the
CPI is bolstered by examining the precise methods used for tangible and
intangible transfers. For tangible property, the temporary regulations
permit the use of CUP, resale price, cost plus, CPM or 'other methods'. 280
While CUP 'ordinarily will provide the most accurate measure of an
arm's length price for the transfer of tangible property',281 the standard
of comparability is that the property and the circumstances must be
'substantially the same', 282 and a 'reasonable number of adjustments' for
'minor' differences can be made only 'if such differences have a definite
and reasonably ascertainable effect on prices or profits'. 283 This level of
comparability will rarely be found.
The other permitted methods (resale price and cost plus) do not
require such a high standard of comparability; 284 but if the taxpayer
disagrees with the Service on their application, the disagreement is likely
to be resolved by resorting to the CPM. Thus, in practice, the temporary
regulations have the same structure as the proposed regulations because
the CPM still 'trumps' the competing method used by the taxpayer in the
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See Prop. Treas. Reg. s. 1.482, 58 Fed. Reg. 5263, 5265 (Intro. to Temp. Treas. Reg.) (21
January 1993) (noting the criticism that 'elevating CPM to such a high level of priority
was inconsistent with' the ALS); see also J. Turro, 'An Interview with U.S. Treasury
International Tax Counsel Jim Mogle (1993) 6 Tax Notes Int'/303 (the International Tax
Counsel accepts the criticism).
Temp. Treas. Reg. s. 1.482-3T(a)(1)-(5) (1993).
Temp. Treas. Reg. s. 1.482-3T(b)(l) (1993).
Temp. Treas. Reg. s. 1.482-3T(b)(2)(i) (1993).
Temp. Treas. Reg. s. 1.482-1T(c)(2)(ii) (1993); cf. Treas. Reg. s. 1.482-3(b)(2)(II).
Temp. Treas. Reg. ss. 1.482-3T(c)(3)(i), 1.482-3T(d)(3)(i) (1993) (both stating 'dose
physical similarity of the property involved in the controlled and uncontrolled transactions
is not ordinarily necessary' for the resale price and cost plus methods, respectively).
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absence of an exact comparable. 285 This pattern is repeated with even
greater clarity in the intangibles portion of the temporary regulations. The
only method that can be used other than the CPM is the 'comparable
uncontrolled transaction' (CUT) method which requires that the comparable intangible be of the same class, relate to the same type of products,
processes or know-how, and have 'substantially the same profit potential'
as the transfer at issue. 286 The last requirement is likely to prove
impossible to meet because almost by definition intangibles licensed to
unrelated parties will not have the same profit potential as those retained
within the related group. 287 In the absence of such a precise uncontrolled
comparable, the taxpayer is practically required to use CPM. 288
CPM itself is essentially the same as CPI in the proposed regulations,
but in some ways it deviates even further from the traditional ALS. CPM
is applied to the 'tested party', measured by profit level indicators derived
from uncontrolled taxpayers that engage in 'similar business activities'.289 The definition of 'similar business activities' is extremely
broad. The uncontrolled taxpayers need be only 'broadly similar', while
'significant product diversity and some functional diversity between the
controlled and uncontrolled transactions is acceptable'. 290 If this liberal
standard is met, CPM will be applied by constructing an 'arm's length
range' from the operating profits of the 'comparables'. CPM can be
applied even if the 'broadly similar' standard is not met; in that case,
the 'arm's length range' will 'ordinarily' consist of the interquartile range

285

286

287

288

289
290

Temp. Treas. Reg. ss. 1.482-3T(c)-(d) (1993); cf. Treas. Reg. ss. 1.482-3(c)-(d). The
taxpayer is unlikely to use 'other methods' despite the permission given in the temporary regulations, Temp. Treas. Reg. s. 1.482-3T(e) (1993), and the final regulations, Treas.
Reg. s. 1.482-3(e), because such methods do not satisfy the 'reasonable belief' standard
of the attendant penalty provisions. See Treas. Reg. s. 1.6662-5(j)(5)(iii), which subject
the taxpayer to draconian penalties of 20 or 40 per cent of the underpayment. IRC ss.
6662(a), (h)(l).
Temp. Treas. Reg. s. 1.482-4T(c) (1993); cf. Treas. Reg. s. l.482-4(c).
Temp. Treas. Reg. s. 1.482-4T(c)(2)(ii)(A) (1993); cf. Treas. Reg. section l.482-4(c)(2)
(iii). In addition, the comparable transfer must meet a stringent list of 'comparable
circumstances'. Temp. Treas. Reg. s. l.482-4T(c)(2)(ii)(B) (1993); cf. Treas. Reg. s.
1.482-4( c)(2)(iii)(B).
Theoretically, the taxpayer can use 'other methods', but once again, their use is constrained by the risk of penalties. IRC s. 6662. See Fuller and Aud, 'The New Temporary
and Proposed Section 482 Regulations', note 271 above, at 540 ('The effect is all too
clear: since CUT is very narrow and "other" methods may not be penalty proof, the
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Temp. Treas. Reg. s. 1.482-ST(c)(l) (1993); cf. Treas. Reg. s. 1.482-S(c).
Temp. Treas. Reg. s. 1.482-ST(c)(l) (1993); cf. Treas. Reg. s. 1.482-S(c).
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from the 25th to the 75th percentile of the constructive operating profits
derived from the profit level indicators of the 'comparable' parties. 291
The pretence that CPM is somehow consistent with the traditional
ALS because it uses some form of comparables is so thin in this case that
it is hard to accept it with a straight face. The 'arm's length' result under
this rule must be constructed by using the profits of other parties that are
not even 'broadly similar' to the related taxpayers under an extremely
liberal standard of similarity. There is no question this use of the CPM is
inconsistent with the 1979 OECD Report, which, as we have seen, only
allows 'some regard to the total profits of the relevant [multinational
enterprise] ... as a check on the assessment of the arm's length price'. 292
The temporary regulations thus represent a return to the basic White
Paper position of paying lip service to the traditional ALS while, in
effect, substituting a much broader and more flexible definition of 'arm's
length' for it. In practice, whenever a disagreement arises between the
taxpayer and the IRS and there is no exact comparable - which is the vast
majority of the cases in which the application of the ALS is significant the winning method is the CPM, according to the Service. The CPM
hardly attempts to masquerade as an ALS method.
The final regulations, issued in July 1994, are 'generally consistent' with
the temporary regulations, and follow the same 'basic policies'. 293 Once
again, the emphasis is on arm's length results. A controlled transaction
meets the ALS 'if the results of the transaction are consistent with the results
that would have been realized if uncontrolled taxpayers had engaged in the
same transaction under the same circumstances (arm's length result)'. 294
The best method rule (BMR), employed in deciding which method the
taxpayer and the IRS should follow, states that the method used must be the
one which 'provides the most reliable measure of an arm's length result'. 295
291
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Temp Treas. Reg. s. 1.482-5T(d)(2)(ii) (1993); cf. Treas. Reg. s. 1.482-1(e)(2).
OECD Report, note 230 above, p. 15. Predictably, our trading partners objected that the
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Thus, the redefinition of the ALS has been completed. A need for the use of
any comparable no longer exists; if a method reaches the same result as what
would have been reached on an arm's length basis without resort to
comparables, it is compatible with the ALS and should be applied.
The main difference between the final and temporary regulations is
the increased flexibility that the final regulations afford both the taxpayer and the Service. Instead of relying on the superiority of the CPM,
the final regulations emphasise the equal status of all the specified
methods, leaving the taxpayer and the Service free to argue which
provides the best arm's length results under the BMR. As one commentator has noted, this feature of the final regulations provides taxpayers
with 'flexibility that may approach that allowed under the 1968 regulations'.296 However, this is hardly a great compliment, given the fate of
the 1968 regulations in the courts. As the architect of the 1993 temporary regulations has stated, this may well create greater controversy and
litigation in the future, without an end in sight. 297 In practice, it still
remains likely, in the view of many commentators, that the Service's
field agents will employ the CPM as their method of choice, 298 while
taxpayers will prefer other methods. The resulting dispute concerning
which method really is the best estimate of arm's length results will
arrive in the courts once again.
The most significant innovation of the final regulations is the elevation
of profit split to a status equal with all other methods of reaching an arm's
length result. The two-level analysis described below may be performed in
cases where either party owns significant intangibles resulting in a residual
profit higher than the profit resulting from the regular functions of the
parties. First, the profits resulting from the standard functions performed
by the parties are allocated on the basis of market comparables; and
second, the residual profit is split according to which party bore the costs
of developing the intangibles (and not which party formally owns the
intangible). 299 It is likely in many of the cases reaching litigation, that the
parties will have significant high-profit intangibles; therefore, the profit
296
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split method will be the one applied under the BMR. 300 This 'residual
profit split' method, however, is clearly not within the traditional ALS
because it does not rely on comparables in making the crucial determination about splitting the residual. As the Treasury observed in its release
accompanying the final regulations, the United States for many years has
been reluctant to permit wide use of profit split methods because they do
not refer solely to results of transactions between unrelated parties in
determining an arm's length result. To the extent that they do not rely on
such results they may be considered to be inconsistent with the arm's
length standard. There are, however, cases in which it is impossible to
locate adequate data to reliably apply one of the other methods. In such a
case a profit split may be the best available method. 301
The adoption of the profit split method in the final regulations marks
the culmination of the trend we have observed since 1972: the fall of the
traditional comparable-based ALS and its replacement by an expanded
definition of 'arm's length', which includes any method reaching arm's
length results. Once the conceptual step to an expanded arm's length
definition is taken, however, no logical barrier exists to accepting any
method which leads to arm's length results, including formulary
methods. The actions needed to take this further step are the topic of
the final section of this chapter.

3.6 1994-2010

Sixteen years have passed since the new transfer pricing regulations were
issued in 1994. In general, these years have been marked by the unwillingness of either the taxpayers or the IRS to challenge directly the application
of the new regulations. Instead, most of the activity has been either in the
APA program, which has grown to over 800 APAs concluded by 2010, in
the administrative appeals process, or relating to peripheral though
important issues like cost sharing. As a result, it is hard to tell what impact
the new regulations have had on transfer pricing litigation.
The transfer pricing cases litigated since 1995 fall into two periods.
From 1995 to 2000 there were several cases litigated, all of which still fell
under the old regulations, and most of which were taxpayer victories.

° Commentators have noted that the profit split method based on comparables is unlikely
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Then there was a hiatus, with no reported cases between 2001 and 2005,
followed by the first important decision on cost sharing in 2005. This
was followed by a lull, but there were another two important decisions
on cost sharing in 2009, both ultimately won by the taxpayer.
The cases litigated in the period between 1995 and 2000 were under
the old regulations and continued the trend of taxpayer victories in the
transfer pricing area, although some split the difference between the IRS
and the taxpayer. In Altama Delta Corp., the Tax Court applied the cost
plus method under the 1968 regulations to transfer prices charged by a
Puerto Rico-based corporation electing the cost sharing method under
section 936 which sold combat boot uppers to its US parent corporation,
which manufactured and sold finished combat boots under a Department of Defense contract. 302 The IRS attempted to limit the subsidiary
to either a 15 per cent mark-up on its non-material costs or to a 7.5 per
cent mark-up on all costs. The court rejected the government's argument
on the grounds that the government's purported comparables were
general footwear manufacturers, whereas the taxpayer was in the combat
boot industry, which enjoyed higher profits in the years in question. The
court also ruled that the government's attempt to apply operating profit
rather than gross profit margins was unreasonable and was not a valid
application of the cost plus method. The court generally accepted the
taxpayer's application to the subsidiary of gross profit margins earned by
others in the combat boot industry, but it limited the gross margin
because the parent faced higher risks than the subsidiary.
Inverworld, Inc. v. Commissioner is generally considered an IRS victory
because the case involved other issues relating to the US subsidiary of a
Caymans corporation controlled by Mexican principals. 303 However, the
case also had a transfer pricing issue, and the Tax Court held that the
IRS' method of allocating income to the US subsidiary was arbitrary and
unreasonable and that the correct amount should be based on arm's
length fees charged by the subsidiary to its clients.
DHL Corp. v. Commissioner was an important case involving intangibles. The taxpayer in 1992 sold to DHLI, its foreign affiliate, the
worldwide rights to its trademark for US $20 million. At the same
304
time, DHL sold 57.5 per cent of DHLI to three unrelated investors.
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The IRS argued that the arm's length price should have been US $300
million, while the taxpayer valued it at US $50 million. The Tax Court
rejected both valuation estimates, and concluded that the value of the
trademark was US $150 million, or 50 per cent of the IRS valuation,
and that US $50 million of that was associated with US rights and US
$100 million with foreign rights. The Ninth Circuit affirmed on the
valuation of the US rights, but rejected any adjustment for foreign
rights because DHLI and not DHL was the owner of such rights under
the 1968 regulations, since it incurred most of the expenses in developing such rights. Thus, the end-result of a US $50 million adjustment
was the same as the taxpayer's position and the case should be viewed
as a significant taxpayer victory in the important area of intangible
valuation.
GAC Produce Co. Inc. illustrates that the IRS can win transfer pricing
cases against small and medium taxpayers that do not have the litigating
resources enjoyed by major multinationals. 305 The case involved a corporate distributor of fresh produce and its controlled entities in Mexico,
and the Tax Court held that the commissions received by the distributor
for marketing services were below arm's length because they did not even
cover its costs. The taxpayer position lost because it was extreme, and it
is doubtful the case can be relied upon as evidence of an improvement in
the IRS' litigation record.
In UPS v. Commissioner the taxpayer transferred its profits from excess
valuation charges, which are premiums paid by customers for replacement of packages lost or damaged in shipping, to a Bermuda affiliate. 306
The Tax Court rejected the transfer as a sham, because while the nominal
transfer was to an unrelated party the ultimate risk and profit was to the
related party, OPL. However, the Court of Appeals reversed, resulting in
another significant taxpayer victory in the area of intangibles. The main
rationale for the Court of Appeals decision was that the charges to
unrelated customers were arm's length, but this does not explain why
the significant profits should be deemed earned by OPL, rather than the
taxpayer.
In Compaq v. Commissioner the taxpayer purchased about 50 per cent
of its printed circuit assemblies from a Singapore subsidiary. 307 The
taxpayer set its prices on a modified cost plus basis, using US standard
305
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Compaq Computer Corp. v. Commissioner, 78 T.C.M. 20 (1999).

TRANSFER PRICING DISPUTES IN THE UNITED STATES

83

costs which were less than Singapore standard costs. The IRS rejected
this method, but the Tax Court approved the taxpayer's position, and
concluded that the notice of deficiency was arbitrary and capricious and
that the prices should be upheld under CUP. The court accepted the
taxpayer's allocation of location savings to the subsidiary and also
declined to adjust the price for volume discounts because these were
not required under the 1968 regulations.
After Compaq there are no final decisions in transfer pricing cases
until 2005, when the first decision on cost sharing came down and was
another major taxpayer victory. Cost sharing grew out of the super
royalty rule that was enacted in 1986 to prevent royalty-free transfers
of intangibles to low tax subsidiaries. Under cost sharing, the taxpayer
and its foreign affiliate can enter into an agreement to share the costs of
developing an intangible in a prescribed ratio, such as 20 to 80 per cent.
The low tax affiliate then pays for its share of the costs of development,
80 per cent in this case, and as a result can book 80 per cent of the
resulting profit without being subject to IRS challenge or to the super
royalty rule. Importantly, no research and development needs to actually
take place in the low tax affiliate, which just has to pay for the costs with
funds contributed by the parent. If the costs are US $1 million and the
profit is US $1 billion, a not unreasonable assumption for pharmaceutical patents, the low tax affiliate can shelter US $800 million from tax at a
cost of US $800,000. 308
The rationale behind the rule was that if the research and development
is unsuccessful, the taxpayer gives up on the deduction of the costs
allocated to the low tax affiliate, since it is a foreign source deduction.
But it seems very generous to allow US $800 million to escape from tax
at a potential risk of a US $800,000 deduction. In addition, taxpayers
avoided even that risk by entering into the agreement only after the value
of the research and development was already established, although then
they had to argue with the IRS on the value of the 'buy in' payment the
affiliate had to make for the established value of the intangible.
The issue in Xilinx v. Commissioner was whether in calculating the cost
to be included in a cost sharing agreement, the taxpayer had to include
the cost of exercising stock options granted to employees who were
performing the R&D. 309 The Tax Court held that because cost sharing
is covered by the ALS, the cost of options should not be included because
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unrelated parties would not have been willing to share the cost of the
options. This case is a very pro-taxpayer result because the deduction of
the option exercise frequently wipes out the US tax liability of high tech
companies, so that as a result most of the profit from an intangible can
remain offshore while the portion allocated to the United States under
the agreement is protected from tax by deducting the option exercise
costs. The case once again illustrates how unrealistic it is to rely on the
ALS because these agreements are usually not entered into between
unrelated parties, and thus the cost sharing issue does not arise.
On appeal, the US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit initially
reversed Xilinx. 310 By a two to one majority, the panel held that costs of
employee stock options must be included in the pool of costs subject to a
tax sharing agreement. However, the same panel later reversed itself and
held for the taxpayer.
The Tax Court decided Xilinx on the ground that unrelated parties
dealing with each other at arm's length would not have shared the cost of
employee stock options, and therefore the ALS requires that these costs not
be shared under a cost sharing agreement either. 311 The Court of Appeals
explicitly accepted this factual finding and even went further in explaining
why unrelated parties would never share the costs of such options. Nevertheless, the majority decided (over a vigorous dissent by Judge Noonan) to
require inclusion of the stock option costs in the sharing pooe 12
The issue in Xilinx was whether to include the cost of employee stock
options in the pool of costs to be shared under a cost sharing agreement
with Xilinx's Irish subsidiary. In general, the more costs need to be
shared, the less valuable is the cost sharing agreement to the taxpayer,
because costs allocated to the Irish subsidiary cannot be deducted in the
United States. Many high tech companies are able to eliminate their US
tax liability by deducting the cost of stock options, while locating their
foreign profits in low tax jurisdictions such as Ireland.
The Tax Court and the dissent argued that because the costs of the
options would not be shared by unrelated parties, under the ALS they
cannot be included in the pool of costs to be shared under the cost
sharing agreement. They pointed out that Treas. Reg. 1.482-l(b)(l)
requires that 'the standard to be applied in every case is that of a taxpayer
dealing at arm's length with an uncontrolled taxpayer', and that of the
US-Ireland tax treaties requires applying the ALS to transfer pricing
310
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cases. Judge Noonan in dissent argued that the ALS is essential to the
purpose of the transfer pricing regulations, which is 'parity between
taxpayers in uncontrolled transactions and taxpayers in controlled transactions. The regulations are not to be construed to stultify that purpose.
If the [ALS] is trumped by [the cost sharing regulations] the purpose of
the statute is frustrated.' 313
However, the majority held that the ALS was not the purpose of IRC
482: 'Significantly, achieving an arm's length result is not itself the regulatory regime's goal; rather, its purpose is to prevent tax evasion by ensuring
taxpayers accurately reflect taxable income attributable to controlled
transactions.' 314 It then held that the language of Treas. Reg. 1.482-1 (b)
(1), incorporating the ALS, is irreconcilable with the language of Treas.
Reg. 1.482-7( d) (1), which required the sharing of 'all of the costs' related
to developing the shared intangible. The conflict arises because unrelated
taxpayers do not share stock options costs because (i) they are hard to
value because no cash outlay is involved; (ii) sharing them in an unrelated
joint venture would create an incentive to minimise the value of the joint
venture to reduce the cost of the options; and (iii) sharing the costs
reduces the deductions available to the taxpayer. 315 For these reasons,
there will be no comparables in which the costs are shared, but the court
nevertheless held that the 'all of the costs' requirement governs because it
is the more specific regulation. Finally, the court rejected the challenge
based on the US-Ireland tax treaty because of the savings clause, which is
found in every US tax treaty and states that the treaty cannot affect the
ability of the United States to tax its own residents, such as Xilinx.
I believe that given the history of IRC 482 and the cost sharing
regulations, the majority were clearly right, albeit not quite for the
reason they give (as the dissent correctly notes, it is hard to put too
much weight on canons of construction such as the one the majority
relied on, i.e., that the specific trumps the general). First, IRC 482
predates the ALS by at least a decade, so that it cannot be said that the
ALS is 'the purpose' of IRC 482. 316 Rather, as the majority correctly
argued, the purpose of IRC 482 is to accurately reflect the taxpayer's
income and prevent tax evasion, and the ALS is only a means to that end
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(which was not really given meaning until1968, over four decades after
the language of IRC 482 was enacted).
Second, there is a good reason why cost sharing cannot be reconciled
with the ALS: cost sharing grew out of the super royalty rule, which was
explicitly not based on the ALS. Thus, the majority were quite correct in
viewing cost sharing as a distinct regime that is not subject to the ALS. If
unrelated parties do not share costs that related parties do, that means
that cost sharing between related parties cannot be governed by the ALS,
and that the ALS is irrelevant to this area of transfer pricing law. That
was the insight of Congress when it enacted the super royalty rule in
1986, and the same insight should be applied to cost sharing.
Third, the majority were also correct in rejecting the challenge posed
by the US-Ireland treaty. However, their reasoning has interesting implications which they do not seem to appreciate. The majority stated that
'Xilinx is not a foreign entity, so applying 1.482-7(d)(l) to it does not
violate the treaty, even if the regulations' all costs requirement is at odds
with the treaty's arm's length standard.' 317 But this point applies to all
transfer pricing cases, not just to those involving a US parent, because
Xilinx also involved a foreign entity (the Irish subsidiary). If the savings
clause is read to enable the IRS to apply non-ALS methods to Xilinx, it
can also apply them to US subsidiaries of foreign parents, because those
are also US resident corporations. In that case the only cases where the
ALS applies under a treaty would be to US branches of foreign entities,
as the courts held (incorrectly) in Natwest. 318
Unfortunately, Xilinx was reversed by the same panel, because the
taxpayer and its allies were able to persuade the panel that the ALS is a
binding standard that must be complied with in all cases. The same
result was reached in Veritas, another cost sharing case in which the
court rejected the method used by the IRS to calculate a buy-in payment
for an intangible, preferring to adopt the taxpayer's comparable uncontrolled transaction method despite clear economic differences. 319 This
case is important because taxpayers frequently wait until they know that
an intangible is valuable before they begin sharing costs with a foreign
317
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affiliate, so as not to risk losing the deduction for some of the costs if the
R&D is unsuccessful. If taxpayers can minimise buy-in payments, there
is no risk in entering into cost sharing agreements.
The IRS has attempted to deal with some of the issues in these cases by
issuing new regulations. It now has issued regulations on transfer pricing
related to both services and intangibles, which are in general similar to the
1994 regulations, with some modifications. It has also recently adopted
new cost sharing regulations that would limit the advantage of the method
by requiring that if the low tax affiliate only contributes cash, it only gets a
normal return on the cash, with the rest of the profit allocated to the
parent. However, in the final version these regulations were relaxed and
the results in Xilinx and Veritas make the method more attractive. The
Obama administration has proposed to limit cost sharing and other
intangible transfer methods, but it is unclear whether Congress will act.
Thus, the litigation record since 1994 has not in general favoured the
IRS much more than the pre-1994 record, although none of these cases
except Xilinx and Veritas were litigated under the new regulations. Some
taxpayers are entering APAs, but these cover only a small part of the
overall transfer pricing universe. Instead, most taxpayers appear to be
taking a wait and see attitude until the first major case under the new
regulations is decided.
For a while, this case seemed likely to be Glaxo. Glaxo involved the
proper allocation of the profit from selling the antacid drug Zantac in
the United States between the UK parent, Glaxo-Wellcome, which did
the research and development and production, and its US affiliate, which
did the distribution. The IRS argued that 50 per cent of the profit should
be allocated to distribution, while the United Kingdom claimed most of
the profit relates to R&D and production.
If the IRS had won Glaxo, that would have helped drive reluctant
taxpayers into the APA program, which is the best hope of resolving the
transfer pricing mess in the absence of consensus on a formula. However, the IRS chose to settle, albeit for a hefty US $3.4 billion (out of
about US $10 billion at stake). One can understand why, given the
litigation record, but now we have to wait until the next big case.
3.7

Conclusion

Fundamentally, I have long believed that corporate taxation should be
source-based, rather than residence-based. The reasons for this belief are
that (a) corporate residence is not very meaningful, since unlike
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individuals corporations are not physically present in any country,
cannot vote, and are an inappropriate subject for redistributive taxation;
and that (b) source-based taxation of corporations rests on the benefits
corporations receive from engaging in business activity in countries that
incurred costs to enable that business activity to take place.
This argument supports the view of those who would move the
United States closer to a territorial system. Territoriality has many
advantages, because it eliminates the incentive not to repatriate earnings,
and offers simplification potential in reducing the need for a foreign tax
credit. If done properly, it is also a revenue raiser because deductions
allocated to exempt foreign source income would be disallowed.
But I have also repeatedly argued against moving in the direction of
territoriality in the current context, and have also supported efforts (like
the current one by the Obama administration) to restrict or even repeal
deferral. The reason is simple: without transfer pricing reform, territoriality will in my opinion lead to an even stronger incentive to shift profits
overseas, and to further revenue losses and erosion of the US corporate
tax base. 320
Thus, I believe that the key to any international tax reform must be a
transfer pricing overhaul. As my co-authors Kim Clausing and Michael
Durst and I have argued, one possibility is to adopt a formula (which we
suggested should be sales-based) to split profits left over after routine
contributions by the related affiliates are accounted for. 321
Such a reform can be enacted by Congress, and we have included
proposed legislative language in our chapter. The original Ninth Circuit
decision in Xilinx supports our position because it points out that the
ALS cannot be applied in a key area of transfer pricing law.
However, our proposals have not so far persuaded opponents of
formulary apportionment (FA). Instead, the advocates of the ALS point
to a list of asserted deficiencies of FA, including:
1. FA is inherently arbitrary.
2. FA will produce double taxation because some countries will apply
the ALS and others FA, and the FA countries will each have a different
formula.
320
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3. FA requires an impossible-to-achieve uniformity of the tax base.
4. FA violates tax treaties.
5. FA will be impossible to enact because of the opposition of the
multinationals and of countries that will lose from its
implementation.
I believe that there is a good answer to each of these arguments, and
have in fact replied to them at length elsewhere. 322 However, I also realise
that my answers are unlikely to persuade FA opponents. Thus, I want to
use this chapter to propose a more modest step forward: adopting FA
only in the context of ALS (rather than replacing the ALS with FA).
The basic problem arises in situations where there are no good
comparables. If good comparables exist, the traditional methods (CUP,
cost plus and resale price) can be used, and that would end the story. But
as the OECD Guidelines acknowledge, in many cases good comparables
are hard to find.
The next possible alternative under the OECD Guidelines is the
transactional net margin method (TNMM). However, TNMM requires
a tougher comparability test than the US CPM, which is good because
CPM has proven to be the most manipulable of the current methods:
an informed economist working for a major accounting firm has told
me he can achieve any result the client wants using CPM. CPM is also a
huge source of transactional complexity, a boon to the large accounting
firms, and a problem for those who cannot afford their services.
But the tougher OECD TNMM comparability standard means that
TNMM cannot be applied in many cases in which CPM is used in
the United States.
This leaves profit split. Under profit split, comparables are used to
allocate the return on routine functions. But that usually leaves a
residual in place, which arises precisely because multinationals
exist to earn a return that cannot be achieved in an arm's length
relationship. That, as explained above, is why good comparables are
hard to find.
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Thus, the key issue in current transfer pricing is how to allocate the
residual under the profit split method. The US regulations assume that
the residual is the result of high profit intangibles and allocate it to where
such intangibles were developed. However, this method is not helpful
because (a) the 0 ECD and the rest of the world rejects it; (b) it penalises
multinationals for conducting R&D in the United States; and (c) it
encourages multinationals to enter into cost sharing agreements that
artificially shift profits to low tax jurisdictions. In addition, as the Bausch
& Lomb court stated, if the value of the intangible results from the fact
that two parties are related, that added value is distinct from where it was
developed.
If the US approach is rejected, the question is how to allocate the
residual. The OECD Guidelines are silent on this issue. This presents an
opportunity: perhaps in this context, it should be possible to adopt a
formula to allocate the residual.
One needs to realise that if there are no comparables (by definition)
and the residual results from the relationship between the parties and
would disappear if they were unrelated, then the ALS is meaningless and
any allocation is arbitrary. Under these circumstances the key is to adopt
the formula that is most likely to achieve consensus.
In the unilateral US context, my co-authors and I support a salesbased formula similar to the destination-basis formula for VAT. This
choice of formula favours exports and therefore is likely to be politically
popular, and it favours the United States because of our trade deficit. 323
In the OECD context, I would prefer a more balanced formula with three
components: payroll, tangible assets and sales.
These three components are, of course, the traditional US state FA
formula. This formula has proven to be remarkably successful, since in
addition to the US states, it is also the basis for the global dealing
regulations in the United States and OECD, and is a leading candidate
for the EU's Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB)
formula. I believe it makes sense because each of its elements is objective
(payroll and sales are transactions with outside parties, and while tangible
assets depend on valuations, there is a lot of experience with asset-based
formulas, such as the US interest allocation formula). Intangibles are
excluded, but in my opinion that is appropriate because (a) their value
results from physical and human capital and from the market and
323
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those elements are included, and (b) you cannot allocate their value and
trying to include them invites manipulation.
Thus, I would propose that in hard transfer pricing cases, in which no
comparables can be found beyond the return on routine functions, the
United States should adopt and the OECD should endorse using the
traditional three factor state formula to allocate the residual under the
profit split method.
I believe this proposal addresses the problems with FA outlined
above:
1. While the formula is arbitrary it relates to economic reality, and any

2.

3.
4.
5.

allocation is arbitrary in the absence of comparables. The current
OECD Guidelines are also arbitrary in not allocating residuals.
It is unlikely that this outcome would lead to more double taxation
than what already occurs for residuals under the ALS. If the United
States allocates residuals based on location of R&D and other
countries disagree, double taxation is already a threat. Disputes
can be resolved using the new arbitration provision under the
OECD model.
If the OECD accepts the residual formula under ALS, it does not
violate treaties and it can be handled in the context of Chapter 9.
Since it is only a residual formula, the base has already been defined
under ALS.
A balanced formula is less likely to produce consistent losers.

Xilinx presents an opportunity for reforming US international taxation. It indicates yet again that the ALS is broken beyond repair. The
reasons are set out at length elsewhere, and I will not repeat them. 324
I believe now is the time to reform transfer pricing, for three reasons:
1. The current debate over deferral and territoriality is unlikely to be
resolved unless the Administration and Congress undertake transfer
pricing reform.
2. The EU, traditionally the bulwark of the ALS, is moving toward
adopting FA as part of its CCCTB project. 325
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3. Even the OECD, also a bulwark of ALS, is showing some flexibility
toward adopting formulas in the context of profit split, and is about
to designate profit split as a method on par with the traditional ALSbased methods. 326
Thus, I believe this a propitious time for reform, and that the Administration and Congress should use the current debate over deferral and
territoriality to engage in transfer pricing reform along the lines outlined
above.
Appendix: Questionnaire (United States)
1. The structure of the law for solving transfer pricing disputes. What is
the structure of the law of the country for solving transfer pricing disputes?
For example, is the mutual agreement procedure (MAP), as regulated in
the relevant tax treaty, the standard method for solving transfer pricing
disputes?

The law is based on a single section of the Internal Revenue Code
(section 482) which is very brief but until 1968 was the only basis for
judicial decisions. In 1968 and again in 1995 there were elaborate
regulatory structures added which are the basis for subsequent decisions.
MAP is of limited usefulness because until recently there was no binding
arbitration in US tax treaties. APAs are more useful.
2. Policy for solving transfer pricing disputes. Is there a gap between the
nominal and effective method for solving transfer pricing disputes in the
country? For example, has the country a strategic policy not to enforce the
arm's length standard (ALS) for fear of driving foreign direct investment to
other competing jurisdictions?
APAs are frequently based on methods that are not ALS (e.g., formulas). There is a lot of emphasis on profit methods. Otherwise ALS is
followed.
3. The prevailing dispute resolution method. Which is the most frequent
method for solving transfer pricing disputes in the country? Does it have a
positive externality? For example, is the MAP the most frequent method,
and if so, to what extent have successful MAPs been used as a proxy for
326
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transfer pricing case law? For instance, Procter & Gamble (P&G) obtained
a bilateral advance pricing agreement (APA) in Europe, and it was then
extended to a third (Asian) country when P&G made this request to the
relevant Asian tax authorities.
Most common traditionally is litigation. After 1991 APAs become more
important but a lot of taxpayers refuse to engage in them because they
have been winning most of the cases after 1980.
4. Transfer pricing case law. What is the evolution path of transfer
pricing litigation in the country? For example: (i) Is transfer pricing litigation being gradually replaced by either MAPs or APAs, as regulated in the
relevant tax treaties? (ii) Are foreign/local transfer pricing precedents and!
or published MAPs increasingly relevant as a source of law for solving
transfer pricing disputes?
Before 1995 the most important method was litigation with taxpayers
being generally very successful. Under new regulations most cases are
settled in appeals and there is increasing importance of APAs but
many taxpayers will not engage in the APA process. MAP is of
limited usefulness.

Has
customary international law been applied in the country to govern the
relevant methods for solving transfer pricing disputes (such as the MAP)?
For example, has the OECD Manual on Effective Mutual Agreement
Procedure ('OECD Manual') been deemed customary international tax
law in the MAP arena for filling procedural gaps (for example, time limit
for implementation of relief where treaties deviate from the OECD Model
Tax Convention)?
5. Customary international law and international tax procedure.

No.

Does strategic interaction
between taxpayers and tax authorities depend on the procedural setting in
which they interact when trying to solve transfer pricing disputes? For
example, which procedural setting in the country prompts the relevant
parties to cooperate with each other the most for solving this sort of dispute,
and why?
6. Procedural setting and strategic interaction.

Taxpayers face a choice between going for an APA and litigating. Many
taxpayers refuse to enter the APA process because they tend to prevail in
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litigation. For smaller taxpayers, however, both APAs and litigation are
prohibitively expensive.
7. The future of transfer pricing disputes resolution. Which is the best
available proposal in light of the interests of the country for facilitating the
global resolution of transfer pricing disputes, and why?
Some combination of profit split with formulas would seem the best
option because it resolves the toughest issue, which is what to do with
residual profits after normal returns are accounted for.

